BOND COVENANTS, BOND ISSUE SIZE, AND CREDIT DEFAULT SPERED PREMIUMS by Du, Jiang
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Dissertations 
2015 
BOND COVENANTS, BOND ISSUE SIZE, AND CREDIT DEFAULT 
SPERED PREMIUMS 
Jiang Du 
University of Rhode Island, jiang_du@my.uri.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss 
Recommended Citation 
Du, Jiang, "BOND COVENANTS, BOND ISSUE SIZE, AND CREDIT DEFAULT SPERED PREMIUMS" (2015). 
Open Access Dissertations. Paper 330. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss/330 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
BOND COVENANTS, BOND ISSUE SIZE, AND CREDIT 
DEFAULT SPERED PREMIUMS 
BY 
JIANG DU 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN 
FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2015 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DISSERTATION 
OF 
Jiang Du 
 
 
 
 
 
      APPROVED: 
        Dissertation Committee: 
                              Major Professor:          Tong Yu                   
                                                                   
                                                                 Shaw Chen   
                                                                   
                                                                Leonard Lardaro 
                                                                   
                                                                Nasser H. Zawia 
                                                                             DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2015 
 
 
  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
My dissertation contains two essays. It discusses the role of bond covenants in 
modern capital market and how they impact firms’ financial activities. Bond 
covenants are effective mechanism to mitigate the agency problems between 
bondholders and bond issuers. The design of bond covenants has extensive 
influence on firms’ financial activities.  
The first essay examines the effect of bond covenants on issue size. The agency 
problems can prevent bondholders from lending fund to issuers. The inclusion of 
bond covenants in indenture can provide bondholder with protection by restricting 
issuers’ activities, indicating the potential relationship between bond issue size 
and covenants. My findings suggest that restrictiveness of bond covenants is 
positively related with the issue size. Due to different agency problem, the design 
of bond covenant put emphasis on different restriction covenant. As a result, the 
essay observes that for investment grade (below grade) issuers issue size is 
positively related with the restrictiveness of financing (investment) covenants. 
Meanwhile due to the severe agency problem in low quality issuers, low rating 
firms have to include more covenants to raise the same amount of capital. The 
findings in the first essay indicate that firms can sacrifice their management by 
including restrictive covenants to raise more capital. 
The second essay examines the effect of bond covenants on likelihood of CDS 
issuance and the level of CDS spreads. Like bond covenants, CDS contracts are 
also effective mechanism to mitigate the agency problem between bondholders 
and bond issuers. The issuance of CDS occurs after firms include bond covenants, 
indicating that one of reasons for CDS is bondholders’ feeling of insecurity due to 
the unrestrictive bond covenants. My findings indicate that the restrictiveness of 
bond covenant can affect the likelihood of CDS issuance. CDS serves as 
complement to bond covenants for investment grade bondholder to mitigate the 
agency problem by providing bondholder with extra protection in the case of 
default. At the same time, bond covenant can also influence the level of CDS 
spreads by influencing the issuers’ default risk because actual use of bond 
covenants can lower the default risk. My findings suggest the level of CDS spread 
is negatively related with the restrictiveness of bond covenants. The findings in 
essay 2 not only provide possible reasons for CDS issuance and an important 
factor influencing the level of CDS spread but also build a link between literature 
of bond covenants and CDS.  
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Essay 1 
 
Bond Covenants, Bond Issue Sizes and Corporate Financial 
Performance 
Abstract 
This essay investigates the effect of bond covenants on the issue size. This 
exploration can provide evidence that firms intentionally sacrifice management 
freedom by including restrictive bond covenants to exchange for large issue size. 
My findings suggest that issue sizes by firms across different ratings are sensitive 
to different group of covenants. Investment grade firms tend to have positive 
relation between issue size and the restrictiveness of financing covenants, while 
below investment grade firms tend to have positive relation between issue size 
and the restrictiveness of investment covenants. Due to more severe agency 
problem in low quality firms, lower rating firms have to accept more restrictive 
covenants to raise the same amount of capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which the suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Bond covenant, an effective form of corporate governance, is 
a legally binding term agreed by both bond holder and bond issuer at the time of 
bond issuance. In their seminal paper on finance contract, Smith and Warner 
(1979) point out that covenants in debt contracts play a crucial role in reducing 
the agency problems between firms and creditors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also imply that corporate bond covenants reduce the cost of debt.  Based on their 
finding, extant research on bond covenants focus on how they will affect firms’ 
investment policy, choice of leverage, agency cost and other relevant issues. The 
purposes of this essay attempt to identify covenant as a channel that may 
contribute to optimize the capital allocation among the bonds across different 
ratings.  
When firms make decision to enter bond market to finance, one of the most 
important things that they are concerned probably is the amount of capital that 
they can raise. Due to the suboptimal incentive effects of debt (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and Smith and Warner (1979)), bondholders tend 
to lend as little capital as possible unless the design of bond covenant can ensure 
their interests and the effective usage of capital. This gives rise to the potential 
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relationship between issue size and restrictiveness of bond covenants. If firms 
include restrictive bond covenants in the bond indenture to exchange for more 
capital, it will provide new evidence for the conjecture that the bond covenants 
are effective mechanism to mitigate the agency problems between bond holders 
and bond issuers (Qi and Wald, 2008; Chava, Kumar and Warga, 2009; Chava 
and Roberts, 2008; Aghion, Philipps and Pratrick, Bolton, 1992). Leland (2004) 
uses structure model to predict the default rate across the different ratings and 
concludes that bonds issued by low rating firms have higher rate to be faced with 
bankruptcy and financial distress. At the same time, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that agency problem become more severe when firms’ financial 
situation is worse. Agency problem is more severe in low rating firms than high 
rating firms, indicating that low rating firms may have to include more covenants 
to raise the same amount of capital. 
Examining the sample of private debt of public firms,  Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) 
point out that the restrictiveness of debt covenant varies across the bond with 
different ratings. The essay provides the consistent evidence by studying the 
public debt indentures. Below-investment grade firms are more likely to include 
investment restriction covenants than financing restriction covenants, while 
investment grade firms are more likely to include financing restriction covenants 
than investment restriction covenants. My findings further suggest that although 
firms do have the tendency to tolerate restrictive covenants to exchange for larger 
issue size, such issue size by firms across ratings are sensitive to different groups 
of restriction covenants. Below investment grade firms tend to use investment 
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restriction covenants to exchange for more capital, while investment grade firms 
tend to use finance restriction covenants to exchange for more capital. Therefore, 
the essay finds that within the sample of below investment grade firms the amount 
of raised capital from the bond issuance has positive relationship with 
restrictiveness of investment covenants, while within investment grade firms there 
exists a positive relationship between the amount of raised capital from the bond 
issuance and the restrictiveness of financing covenants. The essay provides 
evidence for the endogeneity of bond covenants, the yield spread, and issue size. 
My findings suggest that the yield spread of bonds seems to negatively impact the 
issue size of below investment grade firms but has no significant impact on the 
issue size of investment grade firms. At last, the essay finds that the expected 
EBITDA after the bond issuance (AIP) can positively influence the issue size for 
both the below investment grade issuers and the investment grade issuers. As the 
ratings drop, this positive relation becomes weaker too.  
The difference of the covenant design among the bonds across ratings presents 
unique opportunity to examine the link between restrictiveness of covenants and 
ratings and other relevant issues. First, whether there exists the relation across the 
ratings between the restrictiveness of covenants and the amount of raised capital. 
In other word, whether the firms have the tendency to sacrifice their freedom of 
management for raising more capital? The answer to the question concerns 
whether covenant is an effective channel through which firms can obtain the 
needed fund when they are short of capital. Second, if the answer to the first 
question is yes, then whether the amount of capital raised by firms across ratings 
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is sensitive to the same group of bond covenants? The answer to this question will 
tell us whether lenders are concerned that the firms across ratings will violate the 
same group of bond covenants, providing the potential reason for the difference of 
the covenants design.  
To answer the question posed above, however, requires a measure of the firm’s 
overall covenant structure and a measure of the restrictiveness of specific group of 
bond covenants. Thus, in this essay, I construct a large panel data set that contains 
information on firms’ bond covenant structure, leverage and other characteristics. 
I construct this database by merging data on public debt issue from the Fixed 
Investment Securities Database (FISD) with the Compustat database. The version 
of FISD that I employ in the essay reports the incidence of more than 50 different 
types of covenants in over 150,000 debt issues by nonfinancial firms from the 
1960s through the first quarter of 2009. I use this data on individual debt issues 
through time, adjusting for sinking fund payments, calls, puts, conversions, and 
retirements at maturity. I then match this database to Compustat data, collecting 
information from Compustat on leverage, performance index, size and other firm 
characteristics.  
The covenant information in FISD provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
incidence of covenants across a large sample of public debt issues. I find that 
overall the design of bond covenants become more restrictive as the ratings of 
issuers drop. The bonds issued by investment-grade firms tend to have less 
restrictive covenants than those issued by blow investment-grade firms. However, 
the design of bond covenant for firms across ratings put emphasis on restricting 
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different behaviors. The paper provides evidence that lenders are more likely to 
restrict high quality firms’ financing behavior than their investment behaviors. 
Among the sample of investment grade firms, the index of financing restriction 
covenants is greater than that of investment restriction covenants. At the same 
time, lenders are more likely to restrict the low quality firms’ investment behavior 
than their financing behavior. Among the sample of below investment grade firms, 
the index of investment restriction covenants is greater than that of financing 
restriction covenants.  
The difference of bond covenants design suggests that firms across ratings may 
sacrifice different aspects of their management freedom to raise large amount of 
capital from bond issuance. My finding confirms it. Overall, the issue size is 
positively related with the restrictiveness of bond covenants. However, the issue 
size for the firms across different ratings is sensitive to different bond covenants. 
The amount of capital raised by investment-grade firms in the bond issuance is 
positively related with restrictiveness of financing restriction covenants, 
suggesting that investment grade firms tend to sacrifice flexibility of financing for 
the large amount of capital. It is consistent with the bond covenants design among 
investment grade firms. Also, among investment grade firms such positive 
relationship become weaker as the ratings drop. Meanwhile, the bond issue size 
raised by below investment grade firms is positively related with restrictiveness of 
investment covenants but not sensitive to other covenants, suggesting that below 
investment grade firms are likely to sacrifice freedom of investment for the large 
amount of capital. It is consistent with the bond covenants design among below 
  
7 
 
 
investment grade firms. Among below investment grade firms such positive 
relationship become weaker as the ratings drop.  
The yield spread of bonds also has impact on the issue size, although such impact 
varies across issuers with different ratings. The level of yield spreads is associated 
with the default risk that can be influenced by the restrictiveness of bond covenant, 
generating endogeneity of bond covenants and yield spreads. The yield spread can 
directly determine the price of bond, a factor that can decide the quantity of 
supply and demand of bond, which can in turn affect the issue size. After 
controlling the edogeneity, I find that the yield spread is negatively related with 
the issue size in the sample of below investment-grade issuers, while such 
relationship is not significant in the sample of investment grade firms. This 
finding suggests that the influence of the yield spread on the issue size is only 
limited in the sample of below investment grade firms. Another interesting 
finding of this paper is that issue size is also associated with the expectation of the 
financial performance after the bond issuance. Both below investment grade firms 
and investment grade firms tend to have large issue size if they expect better 
financial performance after bond issuance (AIP). However, low rating firms will 
have smaller issue size with the same AIP than high rating firms.  
The contribution of our research lies on two aspect. First, this paper is the first 
one to point out the positive relation between the amount of raised capital and 
restrictiveness of bond covenants varies across different ratings of issuers.  Even 
though using the different sample, Beneish and Press (1993) find that there is a 
positive relation between the restrictiveness of bond covenants and the amount of 
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capital raised from the bond issuance, consistent with our conclusion.  However, 
their finding was based on quite small sample (less than 100 firms) and failed to 
point out which part of subsample is sensitive to which group of bond covenants.  
At the same time, our research is a helpful supplement to the literature about the 
relation between issue size and firms’ performance. Demiroglu and James (2007) 
studies the private bank credit agreement and bond covenants. Their findings 
show that issues size can be predicted by the firms’ financial performance after 
bond issuance. My paper points out this relation varies across ratings even after 
considering the effect of bond on the future financial performance.  
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. I review the literature and 
present testable predictions for the relation between the amount of raised capital, 
ratings and covenants in section II. Section III discusses the debt issue database 
used in our analysis and present descriptive statistics on the incidence of 
covenants in public issues.  Section IV discusses the construction of our firm-year 
database and presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our 
econometric analysis. Section V presents empirical results from the estimation of 
regression with firm characteristic and covenant protection as independent 
variables. Section VI concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The earliest literature about bond covenant is Black and Cox (1976) which 
investigated the effects of three specific provisions (safety covenants, 
subordination arrangements, and restrictions on the financing of interest and 
dividend payments) found in bond indentures. They found that these provisions 
do indeed increase the value of bonds, and that they may have a quite significant 
effect on the behavior of the firm’s securities.  
 Existing literatures about covenant can be divided into two bodies. Since private 
credit agreements are the largest source of financing for corporations (Houston 
and James, 1996; Gomes and Philips, 2005; Sufi, 2009), one body of the 
literatures mainly focuses on private debt covenant. This body of literatures put 
much emphasis on either how the technical default (the violation of debt covenant) 
will influence firms’ following financial policy or how design of the covenant 
affect firms’ value.  
Tirole (2006) suggests that presence of covenants is motivated by their ability to 
mitigate agency problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The covenant violations 
in private debt agreement identify a specific mechanism, the transfer of control 
rights, by which the misalignment of incentives can impact investment. Nini et al. 
(2012) examine U.S. nonfinancial firms’ violation of private debt agreement. 
Their finding suggests that following violations firms experienced decline of 
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acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in leverage and 
shareholder payouts, and an increase in CEO turnover. Chava and Roberts (2008) 
even identify debt covenants as a specific channel through which financing 
frictions impact corporate investment. The decline of capital investment follows a 
financial covenant violation. Whited (1992) and Hennessy (2004) use structural 
econometric approaches to examine the impact of financial friction of covenants 
on the firms’ investment. They also observe the decline of investment following 
the violation of covenant. At the same time, widespread use of capital expenditure 
restrictions in covenants of private debt indenture have been found by Nini et 
al.(2009), Beneish and Press (1993). Nini et al. (2009) point out that conflict of 
interest have a significant impact on firms’ investment policy, and the capital 
expenditure in covenants cause a reduction in firms’ investment. But firm 
experiences subsequent increase in their market value and operating performance 
after firms include new restriction in covenants. At last, Gomes and Philips (2005) 
and Sufi (2009) examine the covenants of bank loan agreements across different 
industry and find that the restrictiveness of covenants positively related to the size 
of the loan. At the same time, they also point out that including the investment 
expenditure restriction in the loan agreement help firm to raise more fund from 
banks, consistent with the prediction in Nini et al. (2009). 
Our article can be categorized into the second body, that is, bond covenants or 
public debt covenants. The extant research on public debt covenants derive from 
Smith and Warner (1979) that regard the bond covenants as effective method to 
mitigate the agency problems between equity holders and bondholders. They 
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think that bond covenants provide a tradeoff between the reduction in the agency 
problem and the costs of negotiating and enforcing covenants. As a result, one 
branch of research in this area focus on how the design of bond covenants balance 
the two sides of the tradeoff to maximize the value of the firm (Malitz, 1986; 
Begley and Feltham, 1999; Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2003; Billett, King, and 
Mauer, 2007; Qi and Wald, 2008; Chava, Kumar and Warga, 2009; Chava and 
Roberts, 2008; Aghion, Philipps and Pratrick, Bolton, 1992). A new emerging line 
of research in this area is looking at the impact of covenants on bond spreads 
(Bradley and Roberts, 2004; and Reisel, 2007).  
Malitz (1986) and Begley and Feltham (1999) identify that firm size and capital 
structure as the important factors that can influence the use of bond covenants. 
Their studies show that small firms and firms with high leverage tend to include 
more restrictive covenants in their bond indenture, indicating that small firms and 
high leverage may worsen the agency problems in firms. Chava et al. (2004), 
Reisel (2004), and Goyal (2005) find that high growth firms are typically less 
likely to include restrictive covenants. Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2003) and 
Billett, King and Maucer (2007) also examine the effect of the growth option 
(investment opportunities) on the restrictiveness of debt covenants from different 
prospectives. Their findings suggest that covenants can mitigate the agency costs 
of debt for high growth firms and covenant protection is increasing in growth 
opportunities firms. Chava and Roberts (2008) find that capital investment 
declines sharply following a financial covenant violations, a conclusion similar to 
private debt covenants. The above bond covenants literatures are based on the 
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assumption that managements have the consistent interest with shareholders. 
Chava, Kumar and Warga (2009) study the effect of bond covenants on mitigating 
the agency problems in firms on the basis of managerial entrenchment. They find 
that entrenchment increases the likelihood of using investment covenants that 
restrict management’s proclivity for undertaking economically inefficient “empire 
building” related investment. However, their findings also show that 
entrenchment is negatively related to the use of covenants on dividend payouts 
and acceptance of takeover offers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
13 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Current literatures show that bond covenants are effective mechanism to mitigate 
the agency problem between bondholders and bond issuers. The design of bond 
covenants can affect cost of debt financing, capital structure, investment policy, 
etc. Bondholders are not willing to lend capital to issuers unless the design of 
bond covenants can protect their interest. At the same time, the restrictiveness of 
bond covenants is associated with bond ratings. This indicates that there are 
potential relationship between the restrictiveness of bond covenants, issue size 
and bond ratings.   
In this section, I will present the four testable hypothesis concerning 
restrictiveness of bond covenants, issue size and ratings. Firms across different 
ratings may be faced with different agency problems. As a result, the bondholders 
will worry that firms across different ratings will have different activities to 
encroach their interests. Therefore, I expect that the relationship between issue 
size and restrictiveness of bond covenants will vary with different ratings.  
The extant literatures (Opler et al. (1999), Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), Diamond (1991, 1993)) point out that firms with 
low ratings are more likely to face with shortage of cash and fall into financial 
distress than firms with high ratings. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Chang and 
Wang (2009), DeAngelo et al (2002), Dittmar et al (2003), and Adam (2008) 
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suggest that firms in bad financial situation have strong impulse to take more 
risky investment opportunity to earn extraordinary profit. So, bondholders are 
more concerned that below investment grade firms will invest risky projects when 
considering to lend them capital. As a result, in the covenant design bondholders 
will require more protection to restrict the below investment firms to take risky 
investment. This is consistent with the findings in Malitz (1986), Nash, J.Netter 
and A. Poulsen (2003), Nini et al.(2009) and Reisel Natalia (2004) that suggest 
bondholders are more likely to include investment restriction covenants when 
they think that issuers are likely to face with financial distress. Therefore, I expect 
that there is a positive relationship between issue size and restrictiveness of 
investment covenants among the bonds issued by below investment grade firms. 
H1: Everything else equal, there is positive relationship between issue size and 
restrictiveness of investment covenants among the bonds issued by below 
investment grade firms.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency problem become more severe 
when firms financial situation become worse.  Since bond covenants are effective 
way to mitigate the agency problem, more severe agency problems means 
bondholder will ask for more restrictive covenants. As a result, I expect for the 
bonds issued by low rating firms with below investment grade will include more 
investment restrictive covenant to exchange for the same amount of capital than 
bonds issued by high rating firms. Therefore, the positive relationship mentioned 
in H1 will decrease as the ratings drop among the investment grade firms. 
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H2: Among the below investment grade sample, firms have to include more 
investment restriction covenants to raise the same amount of capital as the ratings 
drop.  
Nini et al. (2009), Wasserfallen, W. and Wydler, D. (1988), Sorensen, E. (1979), 
DeAngelo et al (2002), and Dittmar et al (2003) suggest that bondholders are 
more concerned that high quality firms may utilize their rich resources to  issue 
senior bond or make excessive payment to shareholders, which are activities 
related to firm’s financing. These activities will also greatly do harm to 
bondholders’ interest. At the same time, Adam (2008) points out bondholders are 
not worried too much about high quality firms to take high risky firm because 
they have more options and stable cash flow that will induce them to avoid the 
risky project. As a result, the issue size of bond by investment grade firm will be 
sensitive to financing restriction covenants rather than investment restriction 
covenants. Therefore, I expect a positive relation between issue size and 
restrictiveness of financing covenants among bonds issued by investment grade 
firms. 
H3: There is positive relation between issue size and restrictiveness of financing 
covenants among bonds issued by investment grade firms.  
The agency problem become severe as the firms’ quality worsens among 
investment grade firms.  As a result, I expect that the bond issued by the low 
rating firm with investment grade will include more investment restrictive 
covenant to exchange for the same amount of capital than high rating ones. 
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Therefore, the positive relationship mentioned in H3 will decrease as the ratings 
drop among the investment grade firms. 
H4: Among the investment grade sample, firms have to include more financing 
restriction covenants to raise the same amount of capital as the ratings drop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA 
4.1 Bond issue data  
My bond data comes from Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). FISD 
keeps comprehensive information on over 150,000 public debt issues. The version 
of FISD that I use contains the bond issued through the first quarter of 2009 and 
that matured after 1989. I follow Chava etal.(2004), Reisel (2004), Billett et 
al.(2007) and Zhang et al.(2013) to gather our sample of bond issues from FISD. I 
first exclude U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, bonds denominated in 
foreign currency, and bonds issued by financial firms and finance subsidiaries in 
our sample. At the same time, I exclude 5,830 medium-term notes (MTNs) 
because FISD does not record covenant information for MTNs. As a result, I 
obtain an initial sample of 28,950 debt issues.  
For this sample of 28,950 bond issues, I verify whether FISD recorded covenant 
information and whether FISD checked “subsequent data” when recording the 
features of the debt issue. The subsequent data flag in the FISD indicates whether 
the issue proceeded beyond the initial input phase, containing data from a 
prospectus, pricing supplement, or other more detailed document or source. Of the 
28,950 bond issues, 15,744 have covenant information and 13,206 have no 
covenant information. In the latter group of issues, 9,613 have a “no” for checked 
subsequent data, while the rest of 3,593 have a “yes” for checked subsequent data.  
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I exclude the 9,613 debt issues, and I include the 3,593 bond issues. As a result, I 
collect a sample of 19,337 (15,744+3,593) bond issues over 1960 to 2009.  
FISD also provides the bond ratings made by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch firms. I 
match the ratings from Moody’s and Fitch with those from S&P to make them 
comparable. So the ratings in our sample range from “AAA” to “C”. I follow S&P 
to define bonds with rating among “AAA” to “BBB-” as investment grade, while 
bonds rated from “BB” to “C” as non-investment grade. Of the 19,337 bond 
issues, 2000 have no rating information, and I exclude them. In this way, I get a 
final sample of 17,337 bond issues from 1960 to 2009.  
I present the distribution of the 17,337 debt issues in table I. They cover a period 
from 1960 to the first quarter of 2009. Since FISD requires the bond issues to 
mature after 1989, I observe that there are relatively few debt issues in the sample 
prior to 1985. The reason that I at last leave these earlier debt issues in the sample 
is that many of them were still outstanding in the 1990s and therefore consist of 
part of our firm-year sample with covenant protection index. As shown in table I, 
the size of investment grade bonds is 1.5 times as big as the size of below-
investment grade bonds.  
Table II present the basic characteristic of the bond issues in our sample. The 
average offering yield is 6.95%. Comparing the yield of a bond issue to the yield 
of U.S. Treasury bonds of similar maturity, I find that the average level of the 
yield spread 1.75%. The average issue size of bond is $383.23 million and a 
maturity of 13.13 years, and more than 98% of the issues are senior bonds. In our 
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sample, 73.2% bonds are investment grade, while 27.7% bonds are BBB- bond 
that is the lowest investment grade. 
4.2 Incidence of bond covenants 
For each debt issue, the FISD reports the incidence of over 50 different bond 
holder protective and issuer restrictive covenants. Smith and Warner (1979) 
divide the bond covenants into three big categories: restriction of dividend 
payouts, restriction of financing and restriction of investment. Since dividend 
payouts is the cash outflow from financing activities in statement of cash flow, I 
further group the above three categories into two: restriction of financing and 
restriction of investment. Since typically there are multiple covenants for each 
type of restricted activity, according to Billett, King and Mauer (2007) summarize 
the 50 different covenants into 15 major restriction, as given by the column of 
Table III. Among these fifteen major restrictions, the first nine ones are restriction 
of financing, while the rest of six ones are restriction of investment.  
The first two categories restrict payouts to equity holders and others. An issue has 
a dividend restriction if there is a covenant limiting the dividend payments of the 
issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer. Typical subsidiary restrictions limit dividend 
payments to the parent, thereby preventing the parent from draining the 
subsidiary’s asset. An issue has a share repurchase restriction if there is a 
covenant limiting the issuer’s freedom to make payments (other than dividend 
payments) to shareholders and others. Note that this covenant would also restrict 
the issuers’ ability to redeem subordinate debt.  
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The next seven categories place restrictions on financing activities. A funded debt 
restriction prevents the issuer and subsidiary from issuing additional debt with a 
maturity of 1 year or longer. The next three covenants restrict the issuer from 
issuing additional subordinate, senior, and secured debt, respectively. Note that 
the secured debt covenant is referred to as a negative pledge, and typically 
specifies that the issuer cannot issue secured debt unless it secures the current 
issue on an equal basis. The category of covenants that I refer to as “total leverage 
tests” includes a variety of accounting-based restrictions on leverage, ranging 
from a requirement that the issuer maintain a specified minimum ration of 
earnings to fixed charges. A sale and leaseback covenant restricts the issuer and 
subsidiary from selling and then leasing back assets that provide security for the 
debt holder. This provision usually requires that the proceeds from the sale be 
used to retire debt or acquire substantially equivalent property. Finally, the stock 
issue restriction restricts the issuer and subsidiary from issuing additional 
common or preferred stock.  
The next three categories are event-driven covenants related to firms’ investment 
activity. An issue has a rating or net worth trigger if certain provisions are 
triggered when firm invests in certain projects prohibited in the agreement signed 
by the issuer.  An issue has a below-investment provision if the firm invests in 
other firms whose ratings are below the firm’s rating. Finally, the poison put 
provision gives the bondholders the right to demand redemption before maturity 
in case such events as restructure, leverage buyout and hostile takeover attempt. 
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The remaining three covenant categories place restrictions on investment policy. 
An issue has an asset sale clause if the issuer and subsidiary are required to use 
the net proceeds from the sale of certain assets to redeem the issue at par or at a 
premium to par. Investment policy restrictions proscribe certain risky investment 
for the issuer and subsidiary. Finally, a merger restriction typically specifies that 
the surviving entity must assume the debt and abide by all of the covenants in the 
debt.  
Table III reports the distribution of the 15 covenant categories for the full sample 
of 17,337 debt issues. The most frequent covenants are merger restriction. 
Consistent with intuition, investment grade bonds (from AAA to BBB-) have 
more restrictive covenants than below-investment grade bonds (from BB to C). 
Meanwhile, in investment grade bonds (from AAA to BBB-) high rating ones 
generally have more restrictive covenants than low rating bonds. This holds true 
for the below investment grade bonds (from BB to C). However observing 
carefully the distribution, I can find there is sudden jump from BBB to BBB-. 
Almost all the 15 categories of the covenants except stock issue restriction 
increase to greater extent than before. Even the lowest firms don’t have to include 
all the covenants in their indentures, demonstrating that they also have negotiation 
power in game of bond covenants design. This enable them to use bond covenants 
to exchange for the capital they need.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
5.1 Construction of firm-year sample 
Since our objective is to examine the relation between bond covenants and 
amount of raised capital across different ratings, I create a firm-year panel 
database that matches the FISD debt issue data to issuer financial data reported in 
Compustat. I begin by using the sample of 17,337 debt issues reported in Table I 
to create a firm-year history of debt issues. Starting in 1960, I trace individual 
debt issue to their issuing firms and then track the firms’ portfolio of debt issues 
over time. I use historical redemption information reported in FISD to account for 
the changing composition of a firm’s debt issue portfolio by adjusting the 
outstanding principal of debt issues for sinking fund payments, calls, puts, 
conversions, and retirement at maturity. 
I then match this historical debt issue database to Compustat data, requiring that 
firms have nomissing values for the dependent and independent variables 
discussed below. I start the firm-year sample in 1989 to allow sufficient time for a 
firm’s debt to develop, and I stop the sample in 2008 because one of the 
independent variables uses data in the year after the year in which market-to-book 
ratio is measured. The final sample consists of 9,153 firm-year observations, 
representing 1,612 different firms over the period from 1989 to 2008.  
Note that I construct the indices of covenant protection from FISD database, 
while I build the financial variables by intersecting the FISD with Compustat. 
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Because of this, it is important to check whether the intersected part of sample can 
represent the Compustat. If not, the financial variables cannot match with the 
indices of covenant protection. Actually, by checking total asset, total fix asset 
value, and total debt in each year, I find that the median ratios of sum of the three 
indices from intersected sample to those from the whole Compustat are 0.54, 0.61, 
0.51, respectively. This suggests that the intersected sample can represent whole 
Compustat sample.      
5.2 The indices of covenant protection 
I follow Billett et al. (2007) to build three indices of covenant protection: overall 
restriction index, investment restriction index and financing restriction index, 
respectively.  I use the 15 categories of covenants presented in table III to create 
firm-year indices of overall restriction covenant. In this index, for a firm in a 
given sample year, I start by creating 15 covenant indicator variables that equal 
one if at least one debt instrument in its FISD debt issue portfolio has the given 
covenant and zero otherwise. I then sum the covenant indicator variables and 
divide by 15 to create an index that varies from zero (no covenant protection) to 
one (complete covenant protection). Note that this index makes the implicit 
assumption that a covenant in one debt issue provides protection for all of a firm’s 
other debt that does not also have that covenant. This seems like a plausible 
assumption, since covenants typically restrict firm policies that have the potential 
to affect all debt holders. For example, covenants in one debt issue that restrict 
payouts to equity holders clearly protect all debt issues, as does an asset sale 
clause or some other restriction on a firm’s investment policy. Additionally, note 
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that this implies that studies that examine the determinants of covenants in 
individual debt issues actually underestimate covenant protection, since covenants 
in other debt issues of the firm can provide implicit protection. Finally, note that 
this index gives equal weight to the various covenant categories, an assumption 
that I will explicitly address in our empirical analysis by examining covenant 
index components. The process of building investment restriction and financing 
restriction index is similar to building overall restriction index. Instead of using 
15 categories of covenant, I use the 9 (6) categories of financing (investment) 
covenants to build financing (investment) restriction index. 
Table IV presents the distribution of three indices across different ratings. From 
the whole sample, the firms almost have the same level of investment index as 
that of financing index. In general, investment-grade firms (from AAA to BBB-) 
tend to have less both investment restriction index and financing restriction index 
than below investment grade firms (below BB). As ratings drop, firms have to 
accept more both investment restriction index and financing restriction index. 
Note a very interesting difference between investment-grade firms and below 
investment-grade firms. The investment grade firms, ranging from AAA to BBB- , 
are more likely to include the financing restriction covenants than investment 
restriction covenants. For each rating from AAA to BBB-, the average financing 
restriction index is greater than investment restriction index. This demonstrates 
that bondholders are more concerned that investment grade firms may over-
finance to encroach their interest.  At the same time, the below investment grade 
firms, ranging from BB to CCC and below, are more likely to include the 
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investment restriction covenants. For each rating from BB to CCC and below the 
average investment restriction index is greater than financing restriction index. 
This demonstrates that bondholders are more concerned that below-investment 
grade firms will invest in risky project to encroach their interest.  
The findings are consistent with the extant literatures. The extant literatures 
(Opler et al. (1999), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Faulkender and Wang (2006), 
Diamond (1991, 1993)) point out that firms with low ratings are more likely to 
face with shortage of cash and fall into financial distress than firms with high 
ratings. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Chang and Wang (2009), DeAngelo et al 
(2002), Dittmar et al (2003), and Adam (2008) suggest that firms in bad financial 
situation have strong impulse to take more risky investment opportunity to earn 
extraordinary profit. So, bondholders are more concerned that below investment 
grade firms will invest risky projects when considering to lend them capital. As a 
result, in the covenant design bondholders will require more protection to restrict 
the below investment firms to take risky investment. Meanwhile, Nini et al. 
(2009), Wasserfallen, W. and Wydler, D. (1988), Sorensen, E. (1979), DeAngelo 
et al (2002), and Dittmar et al (2003) suggest that bondholders are more 
concerned that high quality firms may utilize their rich resources to  issue senior 
bond or make excessive payment to shareholders, which are activities related to 
firm’s financing. These activities will also greatly do harm to bondholders’ 
interest. Adam (2008) points out bondholders are not worried too much about 
high quality firms to take high risky firm because they have more options and 
stable cash flow that will induce them to avoid the risky project. As a result, in the 
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covenant design bondholders will require more protection to restrict the 
investment grade firms to encroach their interests. 
5.3 The financial variables 
After issuance performance (AIP): 
After issuance performance is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total 
value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Average EBIT is 
the mathematical average EBITDA. The predicted EBITDA in each year equal to 
predicted EBITDA in previous year times 1 plus predicted growth rate. The 
predicted growth rate is average growth rate during the same period as maturity 
before the bond issuance. The EBITDA can eliminate the effect of capital 
structure on the performance.  
Yield spreads: 
The yield spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate 
of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the 
yield of Treasury bond from yield of bond. Since the interest rate of Treasury 
bond is risk-free return rate, this variable is always positive. High spread means 
high risk associated with the bond and can reduce the issue price of bond. 
Leverage: 
Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the 
market value of assets. The book value of total debt is long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the 
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book value of equity plus the market value of equity that is equal to the price of 
stock times the outstanding shares.  
Market-to-book ratio: 
I use market-to-book ratio to evaluate the firm’s investment opportunities. Adam 
and Goyal (2003) point out that market-to-book ratio is the best proxy for growth 
opportunities. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-
handed side of balance sheet. 
Maturity: 
Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-
term debt. It is an effective index to measure how urgently the debt will push the 
firm to utilize its cash. I also recognize it as a good index to measure the firms’ 
desire for cash.  
Fixed asset: 
Fixed asset is defined as the ratio of net value of fix asset to the total value of 
asset minus total depreciation. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to 
affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash.  
Volatility: 
I follow Johoson (2003), Opler et al. (1999) to define volatility measure as the 
standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, 
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depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the 
sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to 
measure the stability of the firms earning.  
Profitability: 
Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. Higher profitability can help firm 
to reduce the cost of bond issuance. 
5.4 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of table V presents the descriptive statistics for the variables described 
above. I only present unscaled version of covenant indices to clearly show the size 
of bond covenants. The unscaled version of overall covenant index ranges from 0 
to 15, while the unscaled version of investment (financing) restriction index  
ranges from 0 to 6 (9).  
The mean covenants in the table show that high rating bond tend to have fewer 
covenants than low rating bond. The mean covenant index for the investment 
grade bond is 3.33, while the same index for the below investment grade bond is 
8.23. From AAA to BBB-, the covenant index increases from 3.37 to 8.95 
monotonically, while the covenant index changes from 7.36 to 12.12 
monotonically from BB to C monotonically. The only exception happens between 
the BBB- grade bonds and BB grade bonds where the covenant index drops from 
8.95 to 7.36. At the same time, the covenant index jumps dramatically from 6.53 
to 8.91 from BBB to BBB-. The dramatic fluctuation shows that the bond 
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covenants index has some more particular meaning for BBB- than bonds with 
other ratings.  
The other variables in table IV seems to be in accordance with our intuition. 
Bonds with high ratings tend to have lower leverage level than bond with low 
ratings. The leverage for investment grade bond is 0.31, while 0.51 below 
investment grade bond. High rating bonds tend to have smaller fraction of debt 
maturing within 3 years than low rating bonds because the mean maturity for 
investment grade bond is 0.16 comparing with 0.24 for below investment grade 
bond. The mean M/B ratio for investment grade bond is 1.78, while 0.86 for 
below investment grade bond, demonstrating that high rating firms have better 
investment opportunities than low rating firms. Firms with high ratings seem to 
have larger fraction of fixed asset than firms with low ratings. At the same time, 
volatility of firm with investment grade is 0.04, while 0.13 below investment 
grade firm, meaning that high rating firms have more stable earning. At last, the 
profitability of high rating firms is higher than that of low rating firms. In short, 
the data shows that high rating firms have better financial quality than low rating 
firms.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Empirical Result 
6.1 Endogeneity  
The yield spread and issue size have close interconnectedness with each other. 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) point out that the yield spread at bond issuance 
reflect the firm’s default risk of the firm at that time. Since the price of bond will 
influence the quantity of bond demand and supply, the level of yield spreads will 
determine issue size. Actually, Duffee (1988), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), 
Longstaff et al.(2005) believe that there is negative relationship between issue 
size and the yield spread, meaning that bond with high yield spreads will have 
small issue size. Longstaff et al. (2005) also point out that bond liquidity will also 
be priced in the yield spread. Since the issue size is the measure of liquidity, issue 
size will also influence the yield spread. This will cause the endogeneity in my 
model. At the same time, bond covenant will affect the yield spread because 
restrictive bond covenant will influence the firm’s default risk. Based on the 
above analysis, I build the following models. 
Size = β10 + α1*Yield + β11*Cov1 + β12*Cov2 + β13*M/B + β14*Lev + β15*Rating 
+ β16*log(Asset) + β17*log(Asset)2 + Ɛ1                                                         (1) 
Yield = β20 + α2*Size + β21*Cov1 + β22*Cov2 + β23*Lev + β24*Rating + 
β25*Maturity + β13*EBIT/Asset + Ɛ2                                                               (2) 
Cov1 is the index of investment restriction covenants, while Cov2 is the index of 
financing restriction covenants. I perform preliminary Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
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to examine the endogeneity of the yield in the model 1. To do that, I first run the 
OLS regression in the following model: 
Yield = β30 + β31*Cov1 + β32*Cov2 + β33*Lev + β34*Rating + β35*Maturity + 
β36*EBIT/Asset + Ɛ3                                                                                      (3)                                                                                             
It is similar to model (2) but excludes independent variable issue size. The 
following table presents the result of regression (not including coefficients on 
different ratings). 
At the same time, I predict the residual from the model 3 and name it Yield_res. 
Then I run the regression in the first model with Yield_res included and test the 
statistical significance of coefficient on the Yield_res. If the coefficient on the 
Yield_res is significantly different from zero, then I can conclude that 
endogeneity exists in the model (1).  
The hausman test in table VI shows that the coefficient on the Yield_res is 
significantly different from zero. The p-value is 0.005. It means that the OLS 
estimation is not consistent and provides the evidence that there is endogeneity in 
the model (1).  
6.2   Estimation Result 
This section presents the estimation result of joint determinants of issue size, yield 
and covenant. To account for the endogeneity between issue size, the yield spread 
and covenant index, I estimate the system of equation by generalized method of 
moments (GMM). The reason that this essay applies GMM rather than 2SLS is 
2SLS is special cases of GMM.  
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I report the result of three equation systems with different index of covenants. The 
first systems uses the overall covenant index, while the second (third) system uses 
investment (financing) restrictiveness index. Table VII shows the results of the 
three systems based on the observation of firms across different ratings (from 
AAA to C below). The equation of first system with issue size as dependent 
variable shows that the coefficient on overall covenant index is positive. Note that 
the greater overall covenant index is, the more restrictive the covenant will be. 
This result suggests that there is positive relation between the amount of raised 
capital and the restrictiveness of covenants. At the same time, the issue size is 
negatively related to level of firms’ leverage and maturity, a result consistent with 
Billett et al. (2007). The second and third systems show that coefficients on 
investment restrictiveness index and financing restrictiveness index are not 
significant among the sample of firms across AAA to C and below. Such results 
mean that for the whole sample of the firms overall covenants index dominates 
the effect of covenant restrictiveness on the issue size. There are also some 
interesting finding in the three equation systems based on the whole sample. Issue 
size has positive relationship with predicted performance after bond issuance (AIP) 
because the coefficient on AIP is positive. This finding is consistent with intuition 
that better AIP will improve firms’ long-term solvency, motivating firm to raise 
more fund. The coefficients on the AIP decrease as the rating drops. This 
indicates that low rating firms will have larger AIP to raise the same amount of 
capital than high rating firms.  
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Table VIII presents the results of three equation systems with sample of 
investment grade firms ranging from AAA to BBB-. The equations in the first and 
the second systems with issue size as dependent variable shows that coefficient on 
overall covenant index (investment restrictiveness index) is insignificant. This 
result indicates that for investment grade firms their issue size are not 
significantly related with either overall covenant index or investment 
restrictiveness index. However, the results in the third system show that the 
coefficient on financing restrictiveness index is positive and statistically 
significant. This result demonstrates that for investment grade firms issue size are 
positively related with financing restrictiveness index. This finding is consistent 
with our first hypothesis that there is positive relation between issue size and 
restrictiveness of financing covenant within the sample of investment grade firms.  
I present the result of three equation systems based on the observation of the firms 
across different ratings within investment grade from table IX to table XIII, 
respectively. The results from table IX to table XI show that for AAA, AA, and A 
rating firms the issue size has no significant relationship with the restrictiveness 
of financing covenant because none of the coefficients on financing 
restrictiveness index with issue size as dependent variable is significant. Neither 
the coefficients on investment restrictiveness covenant nor those on overall 
covenant index is significant. The table XII and XIII show that among investment 
grade firms only for BBB and BBB- rating firms there is positive relation between 
issue size and restrictiveness of financing covenant because in these two samples 
of firms the coefficients on financing restrictiveness with issue size as dependent 
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variable is significant and positive. This finding tells us that the positive 
relationship between issue size and financing restrictiveness is driven by BBB and 
BBB- firms. Actually, if I exclude the BBB and BBB- firms from the sample of 
investment grade firms, the positive relationship between issue size and 
restrictiveness of financing covenant disappear. Such result presents in table XIV, 
which only covers the sample of firms across AAA, AA and A rating, where the 
coefficient on financing covenant index is not significant in the equation with the 
dependent variable as issue size. At the same time, the coefficient on financing 
restrictiveness among BBB- firms (in table XIII) is smaller than that among BBB 
firms (in table XII). This indicates BBB- has to use more covenant to exchange 
for the same amount of capital.  It also means that the positive relationship 
between issue size and restrictiveness of financing covenants among investment 
grade firms becomes weaker as ratings drop. This finding is consistent with our 
second hypothesis. The yield spread has no significant effect on the issue size 
among the sample of investment grade firms because none of the coefficients on 
the yield spread is significant in the equations with issue size as dependent 
variable.  
Table XV presents the results of three equation systems with sample of below 
investment grade firms ranging from BB to C and below. The equations in the 
first and the third system with issue size as dependent variable show that 
coefficients on overall covenant index and financing restrictiveness index are 
insignificant. This means that for below investment grade firms their issue size 
are not significantly related with either overall covenant index or financing 
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restrictiveness index. However, the second system shows that the coefficient on 
investment restrictiveness index is positive and statistically significant. This result 
demonstrates that for below investment grade firms issue size are positively 
related with investment restrictiveness index. This finding is consistent with our 
third hypothesis that there is positive relation between issue size and 
restrictiveness of investment covenant within the sample of below investment 
grade firms.  
I present the result of three equation systems based on the observation of the firms 
across different ratings within below investment grade from table XVI to table 
XVIII, respectively. The results from table XVI to table XVIII show that for BB, 
B, and C and below rating firms the issue size are positively related with the 
restrictiveness of investment covenant because each of the coefficient on 
investment restrictiveness index in the equation with issue size as dependent 
variable is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient on 
investment restrictiveness index restrictiveness among B firms (in table XVII) is 
smaller than that among BB firms (in table XVI), and the coefficient on 
investment restrictiveness index restrictiveness among C and below firms (in table 
XVIII) is smaller than that among B firms (in table XVII). This result suggests 
that the positive relationship between issue size and restrictiveness of investment 
covenants among below investment grade firms diminish as ratings drop. The 
finding is consistent with our fourth hypothesis. Meanwhile the coefficient on the 
yield spread in the equations with issue size as dependent variable are negative 
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and statistically significant. This finding indicates that among the below 
investment grade firms the yield spread is related with the issue size.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Agency problem between bondholders and bond issuers can deter bondholders 
from lending fund to bond issuers. Bond covenants are effective mechanism to 
mitigate the agency problem between bondholders and bond issuers, although 
they restrict management activity. Therefore, firms are possible intentionally 
sacrifice management freedom by including bond covenants to exchange for large 
issue size. At the same time, high rating firms are more likely to have less 
restrictive bond covenants. This indicates a potential relationship between bond 
issue size and restrictiveness of bond covenants. The essay finds evidence that 
there is strong connection between bond covenants and firms issue size. 
Restrictiveness of bond covenants increase as ratings drop. Due to the different 
type of agency problems in different rating firms, investment (below investment) 
grade firms are more likely to include more financing (investment) restriction 
covenants than investment (financing) restriction covenants. There is positive 
relationship between issue size and restrictiveness of financing (investment) 
restriction covenants among investment grade (below investment grade) firms 
sample. Low rating firms have more severe agency problem because they are 
more likely faced with financial distress. As a result, the essay further finds that 
low rating firms have to include more restrictive covenants to exchange for the 
same amount of capital.  
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Appendix 1:  
This appendix presents the bond covenants described in the FISD. I construct overall bond 
covenants index, investment restriction covenants index and financing restriction covenants index 
based on the covenant covered in this table. Base on Smith and Warner (1979) I divides them into 
15 major categories which can further be sorted into two groups: financing restriction category and  
investment restriction category. 
 
Category Group Bond covenants 
1 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Flag indicating that payments made to 
shareholders or subsidiary is limited 
2 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from repurchasing stock from 
shareholder 
3 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from issuing subordinate debt 
4 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from issuing senior debt 
5 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from issuing secured debt 
6 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Requires issuer to keep the minimum level of 
leverage 
7 investment restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from selling and leasing back 
assets 
8 Investment restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from acquiring the asset that will 
lower its solvency 
9 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restricts issuers from issuing additional common 
or preferred stock 
10 Investment restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from investing in some fields 
11 Investment restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from changing the control of 
certain asset 
12 Investment restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from investing in certain risky 
project 
13 Investment restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from certain merging and 
acquisition transaction 
14 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from redeeming certain debt 
before the redemption of the liability 
15 Financing restriction 
covenant 
Restrict issuers from refinancing by using the 
collateral asset 
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Table I 
This table presents the distribution of bond issues from the Fixed Investment Securities 
Database (FISD). The sample doesn’t contain U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, 
bonds denominated in foreign currency, bonds issued by financial firms and finance 
subsidiaries, and medium-term notes. All bonds in the sample have the covenant and 
rating information in FISD. We define bonds rated from “AAA” to “BBB-” as investment 
grade bond, while those from “BB“ to “CCC” and below investment grade.  
Year   Investment grade bonds Below investment bonds No. of Issues 
1960-1964 15 6 21 
1965-1969 47 25 72 
1970-1974 56 38 94 
1975-1979 42 21 63 
1980-1984 112 74 186 
1985-1989 801 655 1456 
1990-1994 2276 1395 3671 
1995-1999 3087 2525 5612 
2000-2004 1958 1054 3012 
2005-2009 1952 1198 3150 
All Years 10346 6991 17337 
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Table II 
The table documents the various characteristics of bonds in our sample. The data comes 
from FISD and excludes U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, bonds denominated in 
foreign currency, bonds issued by financial firms and finance subsidiaries, and medium-
term notes. The sample consists of public bonds issued in the period 1960-2009 by U.S. 
firms that have information on covenant and rating grades. The yield spread equals the 
offering yield of a corporate bond issue minus the yield of U. S Treasury bonds of similar 
maturity. The general meaning of our credit rating opinions is summarized below. 
(‘AAA’—Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments.  ‘AA’—Very strong 
capacity to meet financial commitments. ‘A’—Strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments, but somewhat susceptible to adverse economic conditions and changes in 
circumstances. ‘BBB’—Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more 
subject to adverse economic conditions. ‘BBB-‘—Considered lowest investment grade by 
market participants. ‘BB+’—Considered highest speculative grade by market participants. 
‘BB’—Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse 
business, financial and economic conditions. ‘B’—More vulnerable to adverse business, 
financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial 
commitments. ‘CCC’ and below—Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable 
business, financial and economic conditions to meet financial commitments.) 
 
Variable Mean 25th pentl  50th pentl  75th pentl 
                                                                      Panel A: Bond characteristics 
Offering yield (%) 6.95 6.05     7.03 7.41 
Yield spread (%) 1.68 0.71 1.20 2.25 
Offering amount(million) 383.25 175 252 423 
Maturity (in years)  13.13 7.15 10.13 17 
                                                                     Panel B: Seniority features 
Seniority  Freq. Pct. Cum. Pct. 
Senior secured  641 3.7 3.7 
Senior  14615 84.3 88 
Senior subordinate  1820 10.5 98.5 
Junior subordinate  87 0.5 99 
Subordinate  174 1 100 
Total   17337 100  
                                                                   Panel C: S&P bond ratings 
Investment grade  Freq. Pct.  Cum.Pct. 
     AAA  277 1.6                      1.6 
        AA  1127 6.5 8.1 
           A  3485         20.1 28.2 
      BBB  3000 17.3 45.5 
      BBB-  4802 27.7 73.2 
 Below-investment grade 
      BB  2080 12 85.2 
       B  2253 13 98.2 
CCC and below  313 1.8 100 
  17337 100  
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Table III 
Distribution of Covenants across different ratings 
This table presents covenant information about the bond are from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD).The sample of debt excludes U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, 
bonds denominated in foreign currency, bonds issued by financial firms and financial subsidiaries, and medium-term notes. Bond grades come from S&P ratings. I match the grades from 
other credit organization and combine the observation.   (‘AAA’—Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments.  ‘AA’—Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments. 
‘A’—Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible to adverse economic conditions and changes in circumstances. ‘BBB’—Adequate capacity to meet financial 
commitments, but more subject to adverse economic conditions. ‘BBB-‘—Considered lowest investment grade by market participants. ‘BB+’—Considered highest speculative grade by 
market participants. ‘BB’—Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions. ‘B’—More vulnerable to adverse 
business, financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments. ‘CCC’ and below—Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, 
financial and economic conditions to meet financial commitments.) 
      Percentage of bonds in Each rating with the following covenants 
 
 
Category 
 
No.of 
Issues 
Div 
Pmnt 
Restrs. 
1 
Share 
Repur 
Restrs. 
2 
Funded 
Debt 
Restrs. 
3 
Subord 
Debt 
Restrs. 
4 
Senior 
Debt 
Restrs. 
5 
Secured 
Debt 
Restrs. 
6 
Total 
Lev. 
Tests 
7 
Sale & 
Lease-
Back 
8 
Stock 
Issue 
Restrs. 
9 
Rating 
& NW 
Triggers 
10 
Below-
invest 
Provs. 
11 
 
Poison 
Put 
12 
Asset 
Sale 
Clause 
13 
Invest 
policy 
Restrs. 
14 
 
Merger 
Restrs. 
15 
Full sample 17337 34 35 36 34 35 33 37 35 14 36 35 38 33 37 41 
Ratings  
   AAA 277 20 21 17 19 19 20 19 20 9 10 10 12 12 10 11 
      AA 1127 30 24 25 23 27 15 25 15 5 11 11 10 14 12 12 
         A 3485 33 28 29 29 30 31 31 28 9 13 11 15 14 10 12 
   BBB 3000 37 32 33 33 26 32 37 34      11 20 20 18 16 24 22 
   BBB- 4802 48 47      45 43 47 44 43 46 12      41 40 40 44 41 43 
     BB 2080 45 49 43 43 46 48 49 47 15 52 52 49 46 51 50 
       B 2253 48 50 49 51 49 52 49 48 18 66 66 63 65 67 67 
CCC and below 313 49 52 54 48 51 50 53 49 19 70 71 73 69 68 69 
Maturity 
 
Mat. >10 yrs 7129 32 31 30 29 31 28 32 30 11 32 33 31 29 32 36 
Mat. <=10yrs 10208 36 38 38 40 37 38 41 39 17 40 39 43 37 40 40 
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Table IV  
This table presents both investment restriction index and financing restriction index of firms across 
different ratings. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are 
constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ covenant 
indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants. Investment 
restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 6 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt 
issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator 
variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ 
investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, 
which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ 
financing covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given 
covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Bond grades come from S&P ratings. I match the 
grades from other credit organization and combine the observation.   (‘AAA’—Extremely strong capacity 
to meet financial commitments.  ‘AA’—Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments. ‘A’—Strong 
capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible to adverse economic conditions and 
changes in circumstances. ‘BBB’—Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more subject to 
adverse economic conditions. ‘BBB-‘—Considered lowest investment grade by market participants. 
‘BB+’—Considered highest speculative grade by market participants. ‘BB’—Less vulnerable in the near-
term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions. ‘B’—
More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity to 
meet financial commitments. ‘CCC’ and below—Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable 
business, financial and economic conditions to meet financial commitments.) 
 
 
Issuers Ratings 
 
No. of Issues 
Overall 
Covenant 
Index 
Investment Restriction 
Index 
Financing Restriction 
Index 
            Full Sample 17337 0.356 0.362 0.352 
           AAA 275 0.166 0.113 0.201 
            AA 1129 0.200 0.124 0.251 
              A 3475 0.237 0.134 0.307 
           BBB 3000 0.291 0.214 0.343 
            BBB- 4812 0.439 0.424 0.454 
             BB 2180 0.476 0.503 0.458 
               B 2203 0.551 0.656 0.481 
    CCC and below 263 0.588 0.701 0.512 
         Mat.>10yrs 7129 0.633 0.573 0.674 
         Mat.<=10yrs 10208 0.5224 0.517 0.526 
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Table V 
Descriptive Statistics of firms’ financial variables. After issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of 
predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield 
spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the 
similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the 
index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total 
debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the 
outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed 
using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ covenant indicator 
variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants. Investment 
restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 6 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt 
issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator 
variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ 
investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, 
which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ 
financing covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given 
covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Bond grades come from S&P ratings. I match the 
grades from other credit organization and combine the observation.. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of 
assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural log of 
market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance 
when it is faced with the shortage of cash. Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the sample 
year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms 
earning. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
to total value of asset.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 FISD-Compustat Intersection 
Investment grade 
The other 
Nonfinancial 
compustat  
Variable Mean Median Std. Min Max Mean Median 
AIP 0.40 0.40 0.05 0.15 0.65 0.41 0.40 
Yield Spread (%) 0.68 0.67 0.12 0.54 0.85 0.71 0.74 
Leverage 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.69 0.23 0.18 
Maturity 0.16 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.32 0.50 0.45 
Ova cov index 3.33 3.23 0.13 1.12 8.13   
Inv Restr index 1.33 1.35 0.09 0.5      3.61   
Fin Restr index 2.89 2.91 0.17 1.13 5.78   
Market-to-book 1.78 1.41 1.05 0.81 7.12 1.91 1.41 
Log(Asset) 0.43 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.93 0.34 0.29 
Volatility 0.04 0.03 0.04 0 0.19 0.08 0.07 
Profitability 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.48 0.11 0.11 
                        FISD-Compustat  Intersection 
                           Below investment grade 
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AIP 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.07 
Yield Spread 2.89 2.91 0.36 1.16 5.69 2.78 2.74 
Leverage 0.52 0.48 0.23 0.21 0.97 0.19 0.16 
Maturity 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.52 0.50 0.45 
Ova cov index 8.23 8.28 0.23 5.23 12.12   
Inv Restr index      3.13 3.16 0.13 2.13 5.45   
Fin Restr index 4.51 4.53 0.25 3.52 8.31   
Market-to-book 0.86 0.82 1.65 0.53 1.23 2.13 2.03 
 Log(asset) 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.16 0.68 0.42 0.41 
Volatility 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.05 
Profitability 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.05 
                            FISD-Compustat Intersection  
                                       BBB-  grade 
  
AIP 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.12 
Yield Spread 2.71 2.73 0.26 1.89 2.91 2.61 2.64 
Leverage 0.41 0.37 0.21 0.15 0.78 0.21 0.20 
Maturity 0.18 0.15 0.32 0.06 0.34 0.48 0.42 
Ova cov index 7.23 7.21 0.42      4.12 8.13   
Inv Restr index 2.52 2.49 0.16      1.86      3.35   
Fin Restr index 4.12 4.10 0.30 3.11 7.58   
Market-to-book 1.68 1.63 0.06 0.78 6.54 1.72 1.76 
 Log(asset) 0.41 0.40 0.21 0.24 0.96 0.43 0.41 
Volatility 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.07 0.06 
Profitability 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.08 
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                                                                              Table VI 
The table presents the result of Dubin-Wu-Hausman test. This test is to check the endogeneity between 
yield spread, issue size and yield spread. Yield spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the 
interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of 
Treasury bond from yield of bond. Investment restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 6 covenant 
indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities 
Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding 
debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is 
the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the 
Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ financing covenant indicator variables are equal to 
one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. 
Bond grades come from S&P ratings. I match the grades from other credit organization and combine the 
observation. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of 
assets. (The book value of total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of 
asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity that is equal 
to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted 
maturity of the firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant 
indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities 
Database (FISD). EBIT is the earning before interest and taxes. Asset is the market value of firms’ total 
asset.   
   
Yield spread Coef. Std Err. t p>|t| 
Inv Restr index -0.023** 0.00942 -2.44 0.015 
Fin Restr index -0.012*** 0.00313 -3.83 0.000 
Lev 0.118*** 0.0002 3.93 0.000 
Maturity 0.015*** 0.00282 5.31 0.000 
EBIT/Asset -0.007*** 0.00135 -5.18 0.000 
Panel B 
Size Coef. Std. Err. t p>|t| 
Yield spread 1.68*** 0.510 3.29 0.001 
Inv Restr index 0.68*** 0.128 5.31 0.000 
Fin Restr index 0.56*** 0.108 5.18 0.000 
M/B 1.01 0.444 2.27 0.024 
Lev -1.12*** -0.196 5.71 0.000 
Log(Asset) 0.98*** 0.160 6.12 0.000 
Log(Asset)2 0.67 0.416 1.61 0.109 
Yield_res 0.07*** 0.025 2.78 0.000 
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Table VII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of firms across different rating.  After 
issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is 
the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of 
Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of 
total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the 
firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from 
the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given 
covenants. Investment restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 6 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed 
Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given 
covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are 
constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ financing covenant indicator variables are equal to one if 
any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Bond grades come from S&P ratings. I match the grades 
from other credit organization and combine the observation.. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. 
The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural log of 
market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset.  
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.284** 
(0.032) 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.362** 
(0.038) 
0.153*** 
(0.006) 
0.031** 
(0.058) 
0.275*** 
(0.007) 
0.231** 
(0.064) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
0.631** 
(0.003) 
Issue Size  0.008** -0.007***  0.006 -0.010**  0.011 -0.008 
  (0.042) (0.009)   (0.032)    
Overall covenant 0.312***  -0.121***       
 (0.007)  (0.005)       
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Table VIII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of investment grade firms across from AAA 
to BBB-. After issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. 
Yield spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting 
the yield of Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book 
value of total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the 
Investment restriction    0.517  0.426    
Financing restriction       0.612  -0.238 
Yield spread -0.268 -0.012***  -0.189*** -0.024  -0.238*** -0.021  
  (0.007)  (0.006)   (0.004)   
AIP 0.442** -0.026 -0.834*** 1.533*** -0.007 -0.654** 1.224*** -0.127 -0.367 
 (0.041)  (0.004) (0.000)  (0.038) (0.003)   
Rating 0.354 0.026 0.327 0.214 0.036 0.236 0.487 0.031 0.248 
Leverage -0.635*** 0.052*** 0.413*** 0.727*** 0.048 0.368*** 0.594*** 0.039*** 0.364 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.522 0.041** 0.365*** 0.435 0.039*** 0.398*** 0.631 0.025 0.257 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.003)    
Log(asset) 0.438*** -0.049*** -0.328 0.389*** -0.031 -0.137 0.325*** -0.023 -0.231 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.002)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.671 0.018 0.169*** 0.753 0.025 0.156*** 0.587 0.032 0.183 
   (0.000)   (0.003)    
Profitability 0.211*** 0.034*** -0.195*** 0.324*** 0.124 -0.241*** 0.157*** 0.012 -0.357*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.005) 
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firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from 
the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have 
a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are 
constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is 
defined as natural log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with 
the shortage of cash. Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over 
the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. 
Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.404*** 0.034*** 0.471*** 0.241*** 0.027** 0.316*** 0.341** 0.067*** 0.791** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.038) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.026) 
Issue Size    0.012 -0.009***  0.011 -0.012**  0.074 -0.005*** 
   (0.007)   (0.036)   (0.005) 
Overall covenant 0.422  -0.217       
Investment restriction    0.436  0.315    
Financing restriction       0.596***  -0.175*** 
       (0.000)  (0.0032) 
Yield spread -0.388 -0.008  -0.258 -0.017  -0.361 -0.081**  
        (0.032)  
AIP 0.492** -0.037 -0.754*** 1.624*** -0.005 -0.423** 0.743*** -0.164** -0.437*** 
 (0.031)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.028) (0.006) (0.035) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.768*** 0.046*** 0.532*** 0.854*** 0.034 0.451*** 0.531*** 0.047*** 0.397*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table IX 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of AAA rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
Market-to-Book 0.643 0.037** 0.458*** 0.562 0.025*** 0.437*** 0.715 0.038*** 0.127** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.564** 0.044*** 0.341 0.637*** 0.017 0.364 0.691*** 0.084*** 0.691*** 
 (0.032) (0.002)  (0.003)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(asset) 0.547*** -0.058 -0.417 0.571*** -0.019 -0.219 0.549*** -0.076 -0.573 
 (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.752 0.027 0.248*** 0.861 0.034 0.378*** 0.971 0.064 0.329 
   (0.002)   (0.003)    
Profitability 0.188*** 0.051 -0.264*** 0.431*** 0.237 -0.179** 0.139*** 0.085** -0.827*** 
 (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.233*** 0.025*** 0.420** 0.303*** 0.068** 0.248*** 0.421** 0.036*** 0.692** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.032) (0.005) (0.038) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.019 -0.009***  0.003 -0.010**  0.024 -0.011 
   (0.002)   (0.038)    
Overall covenant 0.357  -0.271       
Investment restriction    0.512  0.411    
Financing restriction       0.447  -0.264 
Yield spread -0.274 -0.007***  -0.197 -0.015***  -0.674 -0.019  
  (0.000)   (0.008)     
AIP 0.624** -0.021 -0.514*** 0.793*** -0.008 -0.741** 0.824*** -0.283 -0.534 
 (0.031)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.028) (0.003)   
Leverage 0.724*** 0.052*** 0.754*** 0.631*** 0.031 0.634*** 0.763*** 0.079*** 0.427 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book 0.193 0.042** 0.613*** 0.221 0.052*** 0.772*** 0.824 0.042 0.567 
  (0.041) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.842** 0.037*** 0.462 0.857*** 0.041 0.463 0.921*** 0.052 0.623 
 (0.032) (0.002)  (0.003)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.432*** -0.021*** -0.364 0.467*** -0.017 -0.327 0.823*** -0.081 -0.597 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.007)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.327 0.017 0.127*** 0.921 0.023** 0.247*** 0.754 0.054 0.473 
   (0.002)  (0.035) (0.003)    
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Table X 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of AA rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
Profitability 0.381*** 0.031*** -0.267*** 0.832*** 0.264 -0.362*** 0.354*** 0.028 -0.742*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.198*** 0.045*** 0.521** 0.414*** 0.065** 0.321*** 0.324** 0.045*** 0.712** 
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 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.028) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.036 -0.012***  0.007 -0.015**  0.036 -0.034 
   (0.001)   (0.028)    
Overall covenant 0.257  -0.347       
Investment restriction    0.638  0.527    
Financing restriction       0.457  -0.357 
Yield spread -0.325 -0.006***  -0.267 -0.023***  -0.754 -0.026  
  (0.000)   (0.005)     
AIP 0.597** -0.019 -0.468*** 0.864*** -0.005 -0.725** 0.814*** -0.346 -0.521 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.681*** 0.043*** 0.637*** 0.687*** 0.027 0.632*** 0.627*** 0.085*** 0.354 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.237 0.035** 0.752*** 0.333 0.064*** 0.624*** 0.768 0.062 0.612 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.821** 0.049*** 0.624 0.574*** 0.054 0.574 0.859*** 0.064 0.725 
 (0.022) (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.531*** -0.037*** -0.478 0.444*** -0.023 -0.278 0.911*** -0.097 -0.621 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.175 0.029 0.366*** 0.867 0.032** 0.347*** 0.864 0.064 0.532 
   (0.003)  (0.025) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.435*** 0.045*** -0.427*** 0.654*** 0.354 -0.435*** 0.637*** 0.032 
 
 
-0.823*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
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Table XI 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of A rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
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 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.145*** 0.041*** 0.621** 0.404*** 0.060** 0.315*** 0.217** 0.042*** 0.732** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.030 -0.018***  0.005 -0.014**  0.034 -0.039 
   (0.000)   (0.025)    
Overall covenant 0.247  -0.427       
Investment restriction    0.587  0.521    
Financing restriction       0.457  -0.342 
Yield spread -0.305 -0.006***  -0.387 -0.021***  -0.744 -0.021  
  (0.000)   (0.004)     
AIP 0.590** -0.012 -0.428*** 0.754*** -0.004 -0.675** 0.804*** -0.326 -0.561 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.671*** 0.039*** 0.547*** 0.677*** 0.024 0.629*** 0.621*** 0.090*** 0.364 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.217 0.031** 0.759*** 0.321 0.060*** 0.619*** 0.751 0.073 0.638 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.801** 0.046*** 0.614 0.564*** 0.050 0.569 0.855*** 0.068 0.737 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.513*** -0.032*** -0.485 0.432*** -0.019 -0.275 0.900*** -0.090 -0.671 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.165 0.024 0.376*** 0.862 0.030** 0.340*** 0.859 0.072 0.547 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.421*** 0.040*** -0.437*** 0.642*** 0.345 -0.430*** 0.630*** 0.048 -0.836*** 
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Table XII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of BBB rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.139*** 0.037*** 0.641** 0.354*** 0.075** 0.320*** 0.207** 0.062*** 0.741** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.028 -0.038***  0.004 -0.024**  0.041 -0.019 
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   (0.000)   (0.025)    
Overall covenant 0.240  -0.479       
Investment restriction    0.582  0.537    
Financing restriction       0.674***  -0.312 
Yield spread -0.295 -0.055***  -0.307 -0.081***  -0.704 -0.031  
  (0.000)   (0.004)     
AIP 0.568** -0.060 -0.479*** 0.749*** -0.014 -0.686** 0.754*** -0.336 -0.541 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.668*** 0.082*** 0.569*** 0.637*** 0.028 0.637*** 0.601*** 0.105*** 0.385 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.221 0.075** 0.778*** 0.302 0.068*** 0.642*** 0.721 0.085 0.647 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.831** 0.089*** 0.705 0.534*** 0.055 0.572 0.815*** 0.086 0.787 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.493*** -0.090*** -0.617 0.412*** -0.027 -0.284 0.885*** -0.100 -0.693 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.146 0.070 0.521*** 0.852 0.039** 0.355*** 0.855 0.082 0.674 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.418*** 0.095*** -0.571*** 0.634*** 0.364 -0.463*** 0.620*** 0.062 -0.912*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
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Table XIII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of BBB- rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.218*** 0.031*** 0.584** 0.346*** 0.069** 0.312*** 0.199** 0.058*** 0.698** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.025 -0.032***  0.003 -0.018**  0.034 -0.015 
   (0.000)   (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.154  -0.421       
Investment restriction    0.564  0.521    
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Financing restriction       0.542***  -0.298 
       (0.000)   
Yield spread -0.248 -0.041***  -0.298 -0.074***  -0.692 -0.027  
  (0.000)   (0.004)     
AIP 0.554** -0.060 -0.418*** 0.740*** -0.012 -0.667** 0.724*** -0.331 -0.537 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.658*** 0.075*** 0.558*** 0.618*** 0.016 0.614*** 0.608*** 0.096*** 0.367 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.231 0.070** 0.764*** 0.295 0.066*** 0.579*** 0.716 0.081 0.639 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.807** 0.081*** 0.715 0.524*** 0.057 0.582 0.768*** 0.078 0.762 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.486*** -0.083*** -0.634 0.401*** -0.019 -0.291 0.863*** -0.106 -0.676 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.135 0.062 0.497*** 0.798 0.032** 0.325*** 0.849 0.075 0.668 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.412*** 0.087*** -0.654*** 0.628*** 0.351 -0.393*** 0.612*** 0.059 -0.908*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 
 
Table XIV 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of investment grade firms without BBB and 
BBB-_rating firms. After issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after 
bond issuance. Yield spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated 
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by deducting the yield of Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of 
assets. (The book value of total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the 
weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed 
using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its 
outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant 
indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of 
balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to 
finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the 
stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.172*** 0.025*** 0.659** 0.321*** 0.058** 0.286*** 0.214** 0.095*** 0.736** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.031 -0.027***  0.002 -0.085**  0.064 -0.106 
   (0.000)   (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.197  -0.463       
Investment restriction    0.627  0.631    
Financing restriction       0.469  -0.318 
Yield spread -0.269 -0.037***  -0.357 -0.063***  -0.578 -0.023  
  (0.000)   (0.004)     
AIP 0.714** -0.072 -0.431*** 0.769*** -0.017 -0.751** 0.768*** -0.368 -0.607 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
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Leverage 0.725*** 0.083*** 0.568*** 0.665*** 0.127 0.698*** 0.834*** 0.124*** 0.425 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.364 0.079** 0.775*** 0.328 0.116*** 0.629*** 0.697 0.114 0.736 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.864** 0.086*** 0.805 0.586*** 0.102 0.612 0.827*** 0.127 0.796 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.534*** -0.087*** -0.714 0.529*** -0.029 -0.341 0.758*** -0.134 -0.693 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.164 0.074 0.585*** 0.839 0.041** 0.361*** 0.798 0.095 0.728 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.436*** 0.091*** -0.598*** 0.752*** 0.367 -0.421*** 0.758*** 0.109 -0.896*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 
Table XV 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of below investment grade firms across 
from BB to C and below. After issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period 
after bond issuance. Yield spread is the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, 
calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market 
value of assets. (The book value of total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the 
weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed 
using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its 
outstanding debt issues have a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant 
indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of 
balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to 
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finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the 
stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.183*** 0.019*** 0.439** 0.273*** 0.074** 0.327*** 0.312** 0.047*** 0.734** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.012 -0.012***  0.005*** -0.014**  0.037 -0.009 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.267  -0.371       
Investment restriction    0.621***  0.391***    
    (0.000)  (0.003)    
Financing restriction       0.534  -0.143 
Yield spread -0.157** -0.016***  -0.267*** -0.015***  -0.531*** -0.021  
 (0.031) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000)   
AIP 0.534** -0.039 -0.647*** 0.836*** -0.009 -0.781** 0.935*** -0.154 -0.481 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.671*** 0.067*** 0.637*** 0.763*** 0.051 0.537*** 0.681*** 0.061*** 0.349 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.267 0.053** 0.583*** 0.176 0.047*** 0.671*** 0.792 0.037 0.621 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.739** 0.049*** 0.367 0.934*** 0.032 0.354 0.831*** 0.046 0.583 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
  
 
 
6
5
 
Log(asset) 0.361*** -0.041*** -0.467 0.573*** -0.027 -0.297 0.764*** -0.074 -0.437 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.297 0.026 0.291*** 0.836 0.037** 0.392*** 0.637 0.062 0.367 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.462*** 0.061*** -0.317*** 0.712*** 0.159 -0.473*** 0.267*** 0.034 -0.832*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 
Table XVI 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of BB rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent Issue size Overall Yield spread Issue Size Investment Yield spread Issue Size Financing Yield Spread 
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Variable covenant Restriction Restriction 
Intercept 0.196*** 0.028*** 0.826** 0.489*** 0.058** 0.659*** 0.628** 0.048*** 0.712** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.032) (0.005) (0.028) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.023 -0.069***  0.018** -0.008**  0.069 -0.019 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.169  -0.548       
Investment restriction    0.639***  0.875    
    (0.000)      
Financing restriction       0.569  -0.369 
Yield spread -0.268** -0.029***  -0.532*** -0.032***  -0.267** -0.032  
 (0.031) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000)   
AIP 0.369** -0.057 -0.728*** 0.869*** -0.021 -0.785** 0.569** -0.562 -0.421 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.006)   
Leverage 0.596*** 0.106*** 0.826*** 0.364*** 0.157 0.869*** 0.764*** 0.102 0.624** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.218 0.128** 0.793*** 0.694 0.169*** 0.749*** 0.832 0.048 0.254** 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.763** 0.106*** 0.697 0.342*** 0.173 0.694 0.697*** 0.105 0.596 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.469*** -0.072*** -0.726 0.289*** -0.039 -0.231 0.931*** -0.116 -0.726*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.128 0.052 0.769*** 0.358 0.132** 0.697*** 0.621 0.367** 0.683 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.402*** 0.106*** -0.369*** 0.432*** 0.436 -0.269*** 0.769*** 0.269** -0.128*** 
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 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Table XVII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of B rating firms. After issuance 
performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is the 
difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of Treasury 
bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of total debt is 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the firm’s total long-term 
debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have a given covenants 
that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using 
debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is defined as natural 
log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with the shortage of cash. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years 
preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.186*** 0.098*** 0.826** 0.569*** 0.088** 0.784*** 0.532** 0.042*** 0.857** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.032) (0.005) (0.028) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.093 -0.069***  0.069** -0.004**  0.069 -0.025 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.268  -0.548       
Investment restriction    0.612***  0.897**    
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    (0.000)  (0.032)    
Financing restriction       0.524  -0.567 
Yield spread -0.184** -0.019***  -0.634*** -0.029***  -0.614** -0.042  
 (0.031) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000)   
AIP 0.128** -0.047 -0.728*** 0.629*** -0.018 -0.634** 0.487 -0.421 -0.634 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018)    
Leverage 0.578*** 0.806*** 0.826*** 0.234*** 0.267 0.904*** 0.831 0.234 0.497** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.328 0.768** 0.793*** 0.563 0.489*** 0.842*** 0.832 0.051 0.348** 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.697** 0.366*** 0.697 0.264*** 0.398 0.757 0.347*** 0.237 0.618 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.532*** -0.221*** -0.726 0.187*** -0.017 -0.231 0.478*** -0.172 -0.697*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.167 0.893 0.769*** 0.267** 0.692** 0.764*** 0.535 0.287** 0.759 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001) 
 
 
 
 
   
Profitability 0.531*** 0.693*** -0.369*** 0.364*** 0.431 -0.217*** 0.689*** 0.678** -0.248*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
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Table XVIII 
The Joint Determinants of issue size, covenant and yield spread 
The table presents results of three-equation system estimated by GMM. The results are based on the observation of c and below c rating firms. After 
issuance performance (AIP) is the ratio of predicted average EBITDA to total value of asset within bond maturity period after bond issuance. Yield spread is 
the difference between return rate on bond and the interest rate of five year Treasury bond at the similar maturity, calculated by deducting the yield of 
Treasury bond from yield of bond. Leverage is the index to measure the ratio of book value of total debt to the market value of assets. (The book value of 
total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The market value of asset is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity that is equal to the price of stock times the outstanding shares.) Maturity is defined in our article as the weighted maturity of the 
firm’s total long-term debt. Overall covenant index is the sum of the firm’s 15 covenant indicator variables, which are constructed using debt issue data from 
the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). A firm’ investment covenant indicator variables are equal to one if any of its outstanding debt issues have 
a given covenants that restrict issuers’ investment activities. Financing restriction index is the sum of the firm’s 9 covenant indicator variables, which are 
constructed using debt issue data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Log(Asset) is 
defined as natural log of market value of asset. The fraction of fixed asset is an important factor to affect the firm’s ability to finance when it is faced with 
the shortage of cash. Volatility is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over 
the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. 
Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total value of asset. 
 Three-Equation System Three-Equation System Three-Equation System 
Independent 
Variable 
Issue size Overall 
covenant 
Yield spread Issue Size Investment 
Restriction 
Yield spread Issue Size Financing 
Restriction 
Yield Spread 
Intercept 0.175*** 0.048*** 0.862** 0.254*** 0.061** 0.896*** 0.257** 0.096*** 0.867** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.032) (0.005) (0.028) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue Size    0.063 -0.128***  0.096 -0.003**  0.189 -0.023 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)    
Overall covenant 0.228  -0.628       
Investment restriction    0.568***  0.964**    
    (0.000)  (0.032)    
Financing restriction       0.841  -0.678 
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Yield spread -0.268** -0.048***  -0.732*** -0.056***  -0.714*** -0.011  
 (0.031) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000)   
AIP 0.623** -0.103 -0.328*** 0.648*** -0.034 -0.694** 0.324*** -0.126 -0.621 
 (0.021)  (0.006) (0.000)  (0.018)    
Leverage 0.723*** 0.632*** 0.869*** 0.496*** 0.669 0.997*** 0.421*** 0.364*** 0.658 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Market-to-Book 0.268 0.321** 0.897*** 0.298 0.887*** 0.987*** 0.691 0.218 0.841 
  (0.043) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)    
Maturity 0.768** 0.428*** 0.867 0.394*** 0.978 0.927 0.755*** 0.867 0.968 
 (0.032) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset) 0.596*** -0.090*** -0.768 0.321*** -0.017 -0.204 0.365*** -0.630 -0.583 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Log(asset)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Volatility 0.267 0.093 0.697*** 0.298 0.912** 0.855*** 0.415 0.082 0.864 
   (0.001)  (0.015) (0.001)    
Profitability 0.592*** 0.196*** -0.632*** 0.197*** 0.697 -0.139*** 0.430*** 0.062 -0.182*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
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Essay 2 
Bond Covenants, Credit Default Swap and CDS Spreads 
Abstract 
Both bond covenants and credit default swap contract (CDS) are effective 
mechanism to mitigate the agency problems between bondholders and bond 
issuers. Issuance of CDS is probably due to insufficient protection from bond 
covenants, suggesting that CDS can serve as the complement to bond covenants 
to reduce agency problem. The paper finds among investment grade firms such 
conjecture holds. Investment grade firms tend to have negative relation between 
CDS issuance and the restrictiveness of financing covenants. The essay also finds 
that with the same ratings the CDS spreads are negatively related with 
restrictiveness of bond covenants. Since the restrictiveness of bond covenants is 
negatively related with default rate, the paper provides new evidence that CDS 
spreads are decided by default rate of the bonds. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Agency problem between bondholders and bond issuers is a big issue for firms 
issuing bond. Restrictive bond covenant, an effective form of corporate 
governance, is a common element in bond contract to mitigate the agency 
problem between bondholders and bond issuers. It is a legally binding term 
agreed by both bond holder and bond issuer at the time of bond issuance. Smith 
and Warner (1979) point out that covenants in debt contracts play a crucial role in 
reducing the agency problems between firms and creditors. Jensen and Mackling 
(1976) also imply that corporate bond covenants reduce the cost of debt.   
The market for credit derivatives has been prospering in the past decade from a 
total notional amount of $600 billion in 1999 to more than 25 trillion in 2014. 
Credit default swap (CDS) is the most popular credit derivative (BBA, 2006). The 
contract of CDS is a bilateral agreement between a debt protection seller and a 
debt protection buyer. In a typical CDS transaction there are two counterparties: 
the buyer of protection and the seller of protection. The buyer of protection agrees 
to pay a periodic premium to the seller of protection. In return for the premium 
payment, the seller of the protection will compensate the buyer of protection in 
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case a reference entity specified in the CDS contract experiences a default or 
similar “credit event”. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) and Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) suggest that CDS contract is an effective mechanism to reduce the agency 
problem by providing the bondholders with compensation in the case of default. It 
has been widely accepted that credit default swap (CDS) has lowered the cost of 
debt financing to firms by creating new hedge opportunity and information for 
investors (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009).  
Smith and Warner (1979) and Jensen and Mackling (1976) believe that bond 
covenants are effective institution design to mitigate the agency problem between 
bond issuers and bond holders by providing bondholders with necessary 
protection. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) and Ashcraft and Johnson (2007), 
Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) and Saretto and Tookes (2013) point out CDS 
contract can effectively reduce the agency problem between bond holders and 
bond issuers because CDS  provides bondholders with a guarantee to compensate 
for the loss when bond issuers default. Such protection is also a good mechanism 
to mitigate agency problem. Bond covenants are included in debt contract at the 
time of bond issuance, while most of CDS were issued after bond issuance. This 
suggests that CDS may be a helpful complement to bond covenants for firms to 
further mitigate the agency problem between bondholders and bond issuers. CDS 
provides bondholder with extra protection due to lack of necessary protection 
resulted from insufficiently restrictive bond covenants. Hence, the issuance of 
CDS contract should be negatively related with the restrictiveness of covenants in 
the indentures. The first essay finds that because different type of agency problem 
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existing in firms across different ratings, investment grade (below investment 
grade) are more likely to include financing (investment) restriction covenants than 
investment (financing) restriction covenants. Therefore, for investment grade 
(below investment grade) firms the issuance of CDS should be negatively related 
with the restrictiveness of financing (investment) covenants. My findings confirm 
the above conjecture in the sample of investment grade firms and suggest that 
CDS contract can really serve as a complement to bond covenants to protect bond 
holders. Bonds issued by investment grade firms with less restrictive covenants 
are more likely to issue CDS contract. One concern about the above conjecture is 
that it may be due to the rating effect because generally high rating firms have 
loose covenants design than low rating firms. To eliminate this possibility, I test 
the potential negative relationship between CDS issuance and bond covenant 
among the investment grade samples across different ratings. In each ratings, the 
above conjecture holds.   
The design of bond covenants will influence the likelihood of bond issuers’ 
default by restricting firms’ financing and investment activity. Mansi, Qi and 
Wald (2013) suggest that actual covenant use will lower the probability of default 
and longer firm survival. The premiums of CDS, also called CDS spreads, is 
determined by the probability of bond issuers’ default, demonstrating that there 
might be some potential connection between restrictiveness of bond covenants 
and the spread of CDS. The restrictiveness of bond covenants can affect the level 
of CDS spread by influencing the probability of default. As a result, the level of 
CDS spread should be negatively related with the restrictiveness of covenants. My 
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findings do predict that the restrictiveness of bond covenants will also affect the 
premium of CDS. Due to the different type of agency problem, among the below 
investment bonds the premium of CDS is negatively connected with the 
investment restriction covenant, while among investment bonds the premium of 
CDS is negatively related with the financing restriction covenant. 
The coexistence of both bond covenants, CDSs contract and bond ratings in 
financial market presents unique opportunity to examine the possible connection 
between them and other relevant issues. First, whether the restrictiveness of bond 
covenants has any relationship with the issuance of CDS contract. Both bond 
covenants and CDS contract are effective mechanism to mitigate agency problem. 
Because the bond covenants occur before the issuance of CDS contract, the 
answer to this question indicates whether CDS is complement to bond covenants 
for firms to mitigate the agency problems. In other word, the driving force of CDS 
issuance could be the lack of sufficient protection due to design of bond 
covenants. Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, whether the 
restrictiveness of bond covenants can also affect the premium of the CDS contract. 
Since the restrictiveness of bond covenants can lower the probability of default, 
the answer to this question will provide new evidence that the premium of CDS is 
determined by the likelihood of default.  
To answer the question I posed, however, requires a measure of the firm’s overall 
covenant structure and a measure of the restrictiveness of specific group of bond 
covenants. I follow the essay 1 to construct a large panel data set that contains 
information on firms’ bond covenant structure, leverage and other characteristics. 
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Bond covenants details come from Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), 
which reports the incidence of more than 50 different types of covenants in over 
150,000 debt issues by nonfinancial firms from the 1960s through the first quarter 
of 2009. The identification of CDS bonds comes from MARKIT CDS pricing 
database which include the detail information about CDS and its reference entity. 
Such information provides unique opportunity to examine the relationship 
between bond covenants and CDS. My finding suggests that for investment grade 
bondholders CDS can to some extent serve as substitute for the bond covenants to 
mitigate the agency problem. The likelihood that investment grade bonds have 
CDS issued is negatively related with the restrictiveness of the bonds’ covenants. 
Investment grade bonds with less restrictive covenants are more likely to issue 
CDS contract. At the same time, the paper provides evidence that the above 
negative relationship exists across all the ratings from AAA to BBB-. Based on 
the findings in the first essay about the different type of agency problem in 
different rating, the likelihood that investment grade bonds have CDS issued is 
negatively related with the restrictiveness of the bonds’ financing covenants. 
My paper also provides evidence that bond covenant can affect the level of CDS 
spread. Overall, the bonds with more restrictive covenants tend to have smaller 
CDS spread. Since I presented in essay 1 that low rating bonds include more 
restrictive bond covenant, I test the relationship between restrictiveness of 
covenants and CDS spread after controlling the rating factor. Among the sample 
of bonds issuing CDS and with same rating, the CDS spread negatively related 
with the restrictiveness of bond covenants. Mansi, Qi and Wald (2013) indicate 
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that restrictive bond covenant can lower the default rate. Therefore, the paper 
provides new evidence about the positive relationship between default rate and 
the level of CDS spread.  
The contribution of our research lies on two aspect. First, this paper is the first 
that points out the issuance of CDS contract can serve as substitute for the bond 
covenants to mitigate the agency problem in debt financing.  Even though a lot of 
extant literatures (Hull, Predescu and White (2004), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis 
(2004), Norden and Weber (2004), Ashcraft et al. (2007), and Blanco et al. (2005)) 
point out that the CDS contract can effectively reduce the agency problem in debt. 
At the same time, bond covenant literatures believe that bond covenants can 
mitigate agency problem between bond holders and bond issuers by restricting 
firms’ activities that may encroach bond holders’ interest. But none of them has 
never linked any connection between bond covenants and CDS. My paper is the 
first one attempting to find out the potential relationship between these two 
important mechanisms.  
At the same time, our research is a helpful supplement to the literature about the 
relation between bond ratings and CDS spread. Flannery, Houston and Partnoy 
(2010), Hull, Predescu and White (2004) believe that CDS spread may probably 
be the good substitute for bond rating. My paper points out that bond covenants 
can influence CDS spread, and such relationship varies across ratings.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. I introduce credit default 
swap (CDS) and bond covenants in section 2. I review the literature in section 3 
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and present testable predictions for the relation between the amount of raised 
capital, ratings and covenants in section 4. Section 5 discusses the debt issue 
database used in our analysis and methodology to test the hypothesis.  Section 6 
presents the financial variables used in our econometric analysis. Section 7 
presents empirical results from the estimation of regression with likelihood of 
CDS issuance and CDS spreads as dependent variables and firm characteristic and 
covenant protection index as independent variables. Section 8 present robustness 
check and section 9 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CDS AND BOND COVENANTS 
2.1 Bond covenant 
Bond covenants are legally enforceable rules that borrowers and lenders agree 
upon at the time of a new bond issue. Covenants enumerate what issuers are 
required to do (affirmative covenants) and what they are prohibited from doing 
(negative covenants). The bond trustee is responsible for monitoring covenants 
and potentially taking action against the issuer in the case of violation (Reisel, 
2014). In the event of a covenant violation, the bond’s legal documents specify 
cure periods and remedies available to bondholders. Smith and Warner (1979) 
divide the bond covenants into three big categories: restriction of dividend 
payouts, restriction of financing and restriction of investment. Since the dividend 
payouts resulted from firms’ financing activity, this paper categorizes it into 
restriction of financing. 
Restrictions on financing activities include covenants that limit the future issue of 
debt and sale–leaseback transactions, negative pledge covenants that limit the 
issue of secured debt, restrictions on sale–leaseback transactions, a way to raise 
capital by selling some specific asset to an entity that simultaneously leases the 
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asset back to the organization for a fixed term and agreed-upon rate, additional 
debt covenants such as restrictions on issuance of additional debt unless the issuer 
achieves or maintains certain profitability levels, restrictions on incurring 
additional debt, with limits on absolute dollar amount of debt outstanding; 
restrictions on issuance of any debt with initial maturity of one year or longer. 
Restrictions on investment activities include direct restriction on risky 
investments, restrictions on asset sales, restrictions on mergers–consolidations, 
and restriction on the consolidation or merger of the issuer with another entity, 
Specifically, the restriction on investment activities also include limitations on 
interest coverage or net worth following the transaction and typically requires that 
assets are sold at fair market value and limit the amount of non-cash proceeds 
from asset sales. 
 
2.2 CDS contract 
In its basic form a credit default swap (CDS) or in short a default swap contract is 
an OTC contract between two parties, in which one of the parties, the protection 
buyer, wishes to buy insurance against the possible default on a bond issued by a 
third party. The bond issuer is called the reference entity and the bond itself the 
reference obligation. The reference entity could be a corporation or a sovereign 
issuer. Based on the number of reference entity, the CDS can be divided into 
single-name CDS and basket CDS or (portfolio CDS).  A single-name CDS is one 
that covers a debt security issued by a single reference entity, typically a 
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corporation or a sovereign issuer. A basket CDS covers credit events by more 
than one reference entity. 
The two parties agree to enter into a contract terminating at the time of default by 
the reference entity or at maturity, whichever comes first. In the event of default 
by the reference entity, a CDS can be settled with a cash settlement, in which case 
the buyer keeps the underlying, but is compensated by the seller for the loss 
incurred by the credit event, or with a physical settlement, in which case the buyer 
delivers the reference obligation to the seller and in return receives the full 
notional amount. The cash settlement amount would either be the difference 
between the notional and market value of the reference issue and a predetermined 
fraction of the notional amount. Furthermore, a CDS could include a delivery 
option similar to that found in treasury notes and bond futures contracts. 
In exchange the protection buyer agrees to pay an annuity premium to the 
protection seller until the time of default by the reference entity or maturity of the 
contract, whichever comes first. If default occurs between premium payments, the 
protection buyer must pay to the protection seller the part of the premium that has 
accrued since the most recent CDS premium payment. At origination a standard 
CDS contract does not involve exchange of cash flows (ignoring dealer margins 
and transaction costs) and has therefore a market value of zero. Hence, the 
annuity premium, for which the market value of the CDS is zero, is determined at 
origination. This premium, which is typically quoted in basis points per $100 
notional amount of the reference obligation, is called the market credit default 
swap spread or credit default swap premium.  
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Credit events that typically trigger a CDS include e.g. bankruptcy, failure to make 
a principle or interest payment, repudiation / moratorium, obligation acceleration, 
obligation default or restructuring. 
The maturity of a CDS contract is negotiable and is not necessarily the same as 
the maturity of the reference entity. Maturities from a few months up to ten years 
or more are possible, however, most CDSs are quoted for a benchmark time-to-
maturity of five years. Typical payment terms are quarterly or semi-annually. The 
risk between the protection buyer and protection seller is called the counterparty 
risk and has only little impact on the valuation and hedging of a CDS for most 
practical case. Hence, I do not deal with counterparty risk in this paper. Lando 
(2000) ad Hull & White (2001) examine CDS in the presence of counterparty risk.  
CDS “prices”, as measured in the market, represent the size of the premium paid 
by the buyer of protection and are generally known as CDS “spread”. CDS 
spreads change over time based on supply and demand for particular CDS 
contracts. CDS spreads are analogous to insurance premiums and similarly reflect 
market participants’ assessment of the risk of a default or credit event associated 
with the underlying obligation.  
In general, CDSs are widely and deeply traded, and they help to reflect market 
information about the credit risk of underlying financial obligations. CDS markets 
generally reflect valuable information. Broad market participation suggests that 
CDS prices should convey information about counterparties’ assessment of this 
risk.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since essay I have fully reviewed the literature about the bond covenants, I only 
focus on the literature review on the CDS contract. 
Extant literatures believe that CDSs convey useful information that credit holders 
need. As a result, current literature think that CDSs contract is an effective 
mechanism to mitigate the agency problem between firms and credit holders. Hull, 
Predescu and White (2004) find that the CDS market anticipates credit rating 
events. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), and Blanco 
et al. (2005) all find that CDS market plays a more important role in the price 
discovery process than the bond market. Norden and Weber (2006), in turn, find 
that CDS’ spreads help explain subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan 
spreads. Acharya and Johnson (2005) document the presence of information flow 
from the CDS market to the equity market, especially for firms that have a large 
number of bank relationship and during the time of financial distress.  
Existing studies which analyze the approximately equality between CDS spreads 
and credit spread include studies by Houweling & Vorst (2003), Blanco, Brenan 
& Marsh (2003) and Hull, Predescu & White (2004). Houweling & Vorst (2003). 
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Compare CDS spreads graphically and find that the bond market and the CDS 
market deviate considerably, although the outcome of their analysis varies with 
credit rating. In effect, for A-rated reference entities only small deviation from the 
approximately relationship are found on average. However, for B-rate reference 
entities large deviation between the two are found. 
Blanco et al. (2003) perform a cross sectional regression study of CDS prices, 
risky bond yields and swap rates, using a small cross-section data set consisting of 
both US and European firms. Contrary to Houweling & Vorst (2003), they find 
that the bond market and the CDS markets appear to price credit risk equally for 
most reference entities. 
Hull et al. (2004) regress the CDS spread on the credit spread, using both the 
treasury rate and the swap rate as proxies for the risk-free rate. They find that the 
approximate relationship between CDS spreads and credit spreads does not hold 
with equity.  
Another line of empirical research on the CDSs looks at the determinants of the 
CDS price. Virtually all studies in this part of the literature are regression studies 
which use the CDS price or CDS spread as the dependent variable. Studies 
include Skinner & Townsend (2002), Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko & Huang 
(2002) and Benket (2004). Skinner & Townsend (2002). Duffy, D (1999), Duffy, 
D. & Liu, J. (2001) use arguments from option pricing theory and suggest that the 
CDS price should be highly dependent on the risk-free short rate, the yield of the 
reference obligation, the interest rate volatility, the time to maturity and the 
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payable amount of the reference obligation in the event of default. They find that 
four of these variables contain significant information, namely the risk-free rate, 
yield, volatility and time maturity. 
Benkert (2004) conducts a regression analysis using CDS panel data, 
incorporating variables such as credit rating, liquidity, leverage, historical 
volatility and implied volatility. He finds that implied volatility has a stronger 
effect than historical volatility, and that both remain relevant in the presence of 
credit ratings which contribute an equal amount of explanatory power.  
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) conduct studies on CDS transaction data by regressing 
CDS premium on various poxies for credit risk such as credit rating, risk free 
short rate, slope of the default-free yield curve, time to maturity, stock prices, 
historical volatility, leverage and index returns. They find that most of the 
variables predicted by credit risk pricing theories have significant impact on the 
observed levels of CDS prices, but that credit rating is the most important single 
source of information on credit risk overall. Furthermore, behavioral differences 
between high and low rated underlying, sovereign and corporate underlying and 
underlying from different markets are found. But, none of the above literature 
mentioned the bond covenants can be an important factor influencing the CDS 
price. My paper is a useful complement to them. 
Ericsson, Jan, Kris Jacobs, and Rodolfo Oviedo (2009) investigate linear 
relationship between theoretical determinants of default risk and default swap 
spreads. They find that estimated coefficients for a minimal set of theoretical 
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determinants of default risk are consistent with theory and are significant 
statistically and economically. 
Tang and Yan (2010) examines the impact of the interaction between market and 
default risk on corporate credit spreads. Using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, 
they find that average credit spreads decrease in GDP growth rate, but increase in 
GDP growth volatility and jump risk in the equity market.  
Cao et.al (2010) investigates whether put option-implied volatility is an important 
determinant of CDS spreads. Using a large sample of firms with both CDS and 
options data, they find that individual firms’ put option-implied volatility 
dominates historical volatility in explaining the time-series variation in CDS 
spreads. 
Wang, Hao, Hao Zhou, and Yi Zhou.(2013) find that the firm-level variance risk 
premium has a prominent explanatory power for credit spreads in the presence of 
market- and firm-level control variables established in the existing literature. 
Tzeng, Chi-Feng. (2014) find that interest rate information and market 
information from firm- and index-level risk neutral density (RNDs) are used to 
explain CDS spread changes.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Smith and Warner (1979) and Jensen and Mackling (1976) point out that bond 
covenants are effective mechanism to reduce agency problem between bond 
holders and issuers by restricting issuers’ activities. Hull, Predescu and White 
(2004) and Ashcraft and Johnson (2007), Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) and 
Saretto and Tookes (2013) believe that CDS contract can mitigate the agency 
problem in debt financing by providing bondholders with guarantee in the case of 
default. Because the issuance of CDS contract occur after bond issuance, it is 
reasonable to conjecture CDS is the result of insufficient protection from design 
of bond issuance. Unrestrictive covenants will provide bondholders with less 
protection. Since the restrictiveness of bond covenants vary with the credit ratings, 
high rating bonds tend to have less restrictive covenants than low rating bonds. 
The above conjecture should be based on the bond with the same rating. 
Agency problem presents different contents in firms across different qualities.  
Low quality firms tend to put capital on risky investment projects to earn 
excessive profit. Malitz (1986), Nash, J.Netter and A. Poulsen (2003), Nini et 
al.(2009) and Reisel Natalia (2004) that suggest bondholders are more likely to 
include investment restriction covenants when they think that issuers are likely to 
face with financial distress. Due to the different agency problem, below 
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investment grade bonds are more likely to include investment restriction covenant. 
Therefore, I predict that among below investment grade firm sample, the 
likelihood of CDS issuance with the same rating bond as reference entity is 
negatively related with the restrictiveness of investment restriction covenants. 
H1: Among below investment grade firms, the likelihood of CDS issuance with 
the same rating bond as reference entity is negatively related with the 
restrictiveness of investment restriction covenants. 
On the other hand the suppliers of CDS contract have strong tendency to issue 
CDS with reference entity having small probability of default (Wang et al. (2013), 
Ericsson et al. (2009)).  Mansi et al. (2013) suggest that default rate is negatively 
related with the restrictiveness of bond covenant. Therefore, it is also possible that 
the likelihood of CDS issuance with the same rating bond as reference entity is 
positively related with the restrictiveness of investment restriction covenant.  
Alternative H1: Among below investment grade firms, the likelihood of CDS 
issuance with the same rating bond as reference entity is positively related with 
the restrictiveness of investment restriction covenants. 
Nini et al. (2009), Wasserfallen, W. and Wydler, D. (1988), Sorensen, E. (1979), 
DeAngelo et al (2002), and Dittmar et al (2003) suggest that bondholders are 
more concerned that high quality firms may utilize their rich resources to  issue 
senior bond or make excessive payment to shareholders, which are activities 
related to firm’s financing. At the same time, Adam (2008) points out 
bondholders are not worried too much about high quality firms to take high risky 
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firm because they have more options and stable cash flow that will induce them to 
avoid the risky project. Based on the same logic in the H1, I predict that among 
investment grade firm sample, the likelihood of CDS issuance with the same 
rating bond as reference entity is negatively related with the restrictiveness of 
financing restriction covenants. 
H2: Among investment grade firms, the likelihood of CDS issuance with the same 
rating bond as reference entity is negatively related with the restrictiveness of 
financing restriction covenants. 
With the same logic as the hypothesis one, the alternative to hypothesis 2 can be 
among investment grade firms, the likelihood of CDS issuance with the same 
rating bond as reference entity is positively related with the restrictiveness of 
financing restriction covenants. 
Alternative H2: among investment grade firms, the likelihood of CDS issuance 
with the same rating bond as reference entity is positively related with the 
restrictiveness of financing restriction covenants. 
CDS spread is the premium that bond holders pay in return for the compensation 
in case the bond issuers default.  Ericsson et al. (2009) think that bankruptcy risk 
is the most important determinant of CDS spreads. High bankruptcy risk causes 
bond holder to pay high premium. As a result, they believe that CDS spreads are 
positively related with the probability of firms’ bankruptcy. Mansi, Qi and Wald 
(2013) believe that actual covenant use will lower the probability of default and 
longer firm survival. Based on the different agency problem I discuss in the 
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hypothesis one and two, I expect that among below investment grade bonds the 
CDS spreads are negatively related with the restrictiveness of investment 
covenants. 
H3: Among below investment grade bonds sample, the CDS spreads are 
negatively related with the restrictiveness of investment covenants. 
Following the same logic in the H3, I can reasonably predict that among 
investment grade bonds sample the CDS spreads are negatively related with 
restrictiveness of financing covenants. 
H4: Among investment grade bonds sample, the CDS spreads are negatively 
related with the restrictiveness of financing covenants.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data sources 
The data for this paper came from several sources. To measure stock market 
performance, we use information from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
daily stock file. I obtain firms’ financial information from the Compustat database. 
Compustat covers firms’ financial information such as asset, equity, debt, return 
and so on. To measure the firms’ bond covenant index, I obtain data of bond 
covenants from Fix Investment Security Database (FISD) which includes 50 
incidences of bond covenants ranging from  dividend payment restriction, share 
repurchase restriction, funded debt restriction, subordinated debt restriction, total 
leverage restriction, stock issuance restriction, cross-default provision, to 
investment and merger restriction. The rich details on bond covenants contained 
in the FIDS database offers us a wonderful opportunity to study the design of 
bond indentures which will influence various aspects of firms’ operation. The 
analysis of bond covenants in FISD may yield a good picture how the items of 
bond covenant distribute across firms with different ratings. I follow the first 
essay to exclude U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, bonds denominated in 
foreign currency, and bonds issued by financial firms and finance subsidiaries in 
our sample because these bonds are not comparable with other bonds due to their 
different financial background. I exclude all medium-term notes (MTNs) because 
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FISD does not record covenant information for MTNs. At the same time, I follow 
the first essay to categorize all the covenants into two groups. One is investment 
restriction covenants, while the other is financing restriction covenants.  
Information obtained about the CDS came from the MARKIT® database. 
MARKIT was founded in 2003 after agreements with large market participants to 
establish a database to enhance liquidity, transparency, and standardization in the 
credit derivatives market]. Currently, MARKIT provides CDS spread information 
on most corporations with nontrivial CDS trading (around 3,000 firms and 
sovereigns). MARKIT’s coverage of the earlier period is also quite broad, 
covering most companies with CDS trades (in 2002, the coverage includes 
roughly 1,400 companies and sovereigns). Despite the long historical coverage, 
the MARKIT database does not include every company with CDS trading. It 
acknowledges that a small fraction of traded reference entities might not be 
reported because information on market participants is not adequate for 
construction of accurate composite measure of CDS spread. The undisclosed 
information on these CDS firms raises concerns about sample bias, as many of 
them will be included in the non-CDS sample. However, the misclassification of 
CDS firms as non-CDS firms would actually  
The database contains complete CDS information in US market and provides 
exact information on the existence of an outstanding CDS contract on the firm’s 
dollar-denominated senior unsecured debt. What makes the MARKIT database 
different from other database which also contains CDS information is that 
MARKIT has the information about the reference entity. The information about 
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the reference entity in MARKIT is CUSIP that is the identifier of the firms and 
that is also included in FIDS and Compustat. This makes it possible to link the 
information from FIDS, Compustat and MARKIT to study the relation among 
bond covenants, CDS, and firms’ financial situation.  
5.2 Construction of panel data 
I collect my sample of debt issues from the Fixed Investment Securities Database 
(FISD), which contains detailed information on over 141,056 public debt issues 
across all rating categories. The version of FISD that I use includes debt issues 
that were issued through the first quarter of 2010 and that matured after 1989. 
After excluding U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, bonds denominated in 
foreign currency, and bonds issued by financial firms and finance subsidiaries, I 
obtain an initial sample of 30,865 debt issues over 1989 to 2010. From this 
sample, I then exclude 6173 medium-term notes (MTNs), since FISD does not 
record covenant information for MTNs. 
For the remaining sample of 24,692 debt issues, I verify whether FISD recorded 
covenant information and whether FISD checked “subsequent data” when 
recording the feature of the debt issue. The subsequent data flag in the FISD 
indicates whether the issue proceeded beyond the initial input phase, containing 
data from source. Of the 24,692 debt issues, 14567 have covenant information 
and rating information, and 10125 have no covenant or rating information. In the 
latter group of issues, 7608 (2517) have a “no” (“yes”) for checked subsequent 
data. I exclude the 7608 debt issues and include 2517 debt issues. This leaves me 
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17084 debt issue over 1995 to 2010. Since Markit starts to record data from 2000, 
I exclude all debt issues that mature before 2000 and get 16084 debt issues. I then 
match it to the Markit by the CUSIP to mark the debt issues with CDS and those 
without CDS. Table 1 report the distribution of debt issue with and without CDS 
across different ratings. I then match the database to Compustat data, requiring 
firms have nonmissing value for both dependent and independent variables. At 
last, I get 9023 firm-year observations (5763 with CDS, 3260 without CDS), 
representing 1506 different firms over the period from 2000 to 2010.  
5.3 Methodology 
The first hypothesis is to test the likelihood of CDS issuance with the 
restrictiveness of bond covenants. Since the dependent variable is discrete binary 
variable, I use logistic regression (logit model) to test the first hypothesis. In 
statistics, logit model is a type of probabilistic statistical classification model. It is 
used to predict a binary response from a binary predictor, used for predicting the 
outcome of a categorical dependent variable. Logistic regression measures the 
relationship between the categorical dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables, which are usually (but not necessarily) continuous, by 
using probability scores as the predicted values of the dependent variable. Thus, it 
treats the same set of problems as probit regression using similar techniques; the 
first assumes a logistic function and the second   and the second a standard normal 
distribution function. Logistic regression can be seen as a special case 
of generalized line model and thus analogous to linear regression. The model of 
logistic regression, however, is based on quite different assumptions from those of 
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linear regression. In particular the key differences of these two models can be 
seen in the following two features of logistic regression. First, the conditional 
mean  follows a Bernoulli distribution rather than a Gaussian 
distribution, because logistic regression is a classifier (non-quantitative or 
categorical) data. Second, the linear combination of the inputs  is 
restricted to [0, 1] through the logistic distribution function because logistic 
regression predicts the probability of the instance being positive. The logistic 
function is useful because it can take an input with any value from negative to 
positive infinity, whereas the output always takes values between zero and 
one and hence is interpretable as a probability. The logistic function  is 
defined as follows: 
 
 If  is viewed as a linear function of an explanatory variable  (or of a linear 
combination of explanatory variables), then we express  as follows: 
 
And the logistic function can now be written as: 
 
Note that  is interpreted as the probability of the dependent variable 
equaling a "success" (issuance of CDS contract in this paper) or "case" (failure to 
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issue CDS contract in this paper) rather than a failure or non-case. It's clear that 
the response variables  are not identically distributed:  differs 
from one data point  to another, though they are independent given design 
matrix  and shared with parameters . 
The method to test the second and the third hypothesis are OLS regression model. 
Since the CDS issuance is after the bond issuance, there is no endogenous 
behavior between restrictiveness of bond covenant and CDS spread, i.e., their 
cross-correlation is zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
97 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
VARIABLES 
 
In this section, I present all the variables used in the model.  
Overall bond covenants index: 
Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all 
covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants 
index ranges from 0 to 1. Please refer to the first essay to check about how to 
construct overall bond covenants index. The larger the index, the more restrictive 
the overall bond covenant is.  
Investment restriction covenants index: 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture 
that a firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index also ranges 
from 0 to 1. Please refer to the first essay to check how to construct investment 
restriction covenants index. The larger the index, the more restrictive the overall 
bond covenant is.  
Financing restriction covenants index: 
Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture 
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that a firm is faced with. The financing restriction covenants index also ranges 
from 0 to 1. Please refer to the first essay to check how to construct financing 
restriction covenants index. The larger the index, the more restrictive the overall 
bond covenant is.  
Firm Size 
Firm size is a proxy for takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper 
firm size is measured as natural log of total market assets. Total market asset is 
calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt, while market value 
of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by number of outstanding 
shares.  
Market-to-book ratio: 
I use market-to-book ratio to evaluate the firm’s investment opportunities. Adam 
and Goyal (2003) point out that market-to-book ratio is the best proxy for growth 
opportunities. Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-
handed side of balance sheet. 
Volatility: 
I follow Johnson (2003), Osler et al. (1999) to define volatility measure as the 
standard deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the 
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sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to 
measure the stability of the firms earning.  
Working capital: 
Working capital is the financial metric that measures operating liquidity available 
to a firm. Working capital is calculated as current assets minus current liability. If 
current assets are less than current liabilities, the firm has a working capital 
deficiency, also called a working capital deficit. Otherwise, the firm has a 
working capital surplus. In this paper, in order to consider the effect of firms’ size, 
I use the ratio of difference between current assets and current liability to the 
market value of firms’ asset.  
Profitability: 
Firm profitability, a measure of current performance, is measured as the ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
market value of asset.  
Year dummy: 
Year dummy variable is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation 
is in that year, otherwise zero.  
Debt ratio: 
Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is measured as the 
ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market value of 
total asset. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 In this section, I am going to present the estimation result of my test. I first report 
the result of logit model of CDS issuance with different index of covenants. The 
first column uses the overall covenant index, while the second (third) column uses 
financing (investment) restrictiveness index. Table II shows the results of the logit 
model results based on the observation of firms across different ratings (from 
AAA to C below). The equation of first column with likelihood of CDS issuance 
as dependent variable shows that the coefficient on overall covenant index is 
positive. Note that the greater overall covenant index is, the more restrictive the 
covenants will be. This result suggests that there is negative relation between the 
likelihood of CDS issuance and the restrictiveness of covenants. Bonds with more 
restrictive covenants have smaller likelihood to issue CDS contract. At the same 
time, the CDS issuance is negatively related with firms’ profitability, a result 
suggesting that high profitability will lower the likelihood of CDS issuance. This 
finding is consistent with our first hypothesis that there is negative relation 
between the likelihood of CDS issuance and restrictiveness of bond covenant. The 
second and third systems show that coefficients on investment restrictiveness 
index and financing restrictiveness index are not significant among the sample of 
firms across AAA to C and below. Such results mean that for the whole sample of 
the firms overall covenants index dominates the effect of covenant restrictiveness 
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on the issuance of CDS contract. There are also some interesting finding in the 
result of logit model based on the whole sample. The issuance of CDS has 
negative relationship with working capital because the coefficient on CDS is 
negative. This finding is consistent with intuition that more working capital means 
high liquidity of the firm and decrease the probability of bankruptcy. As a result, 
more working capital will lower the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
Table III presents the results of log model of CDS issuance with sample of 
investment grade firms ranging from AAA to BBB-. The results on the first and 
the third column with likelihood of CDS issuance as dependent variable shows 
that coefficient on overall covenant index (investment restrictiveness index) is 
insignificant. This result indicates that for investment grade firms the issuance of 
CDS contract are not significantly related with either overall covenant index or 
investment restrictiveness index. However, the results on the second column show 
that the coefficient on financing restrictiveness index is positive and statistically 
significant. This result demonstrates that for investment grade firms the likelihood 
of CDS issuance are negatively related with financing restrictiveness index.  
Since the restrictiveness of covenants increase as the ratings lower, I cannot rule 
out the rating effect from the above conclusion. I present the results of logit model 
based on the observation of the firms across different ratings within investment 
grade from table IV to table VIII, respectively. The results from table IV to table 
VIII show that for the firms of each ratings among investment grade the 
likelihood of CDS issuance has no significant relationship with the restrictiveness 
of overall covenants index and restrictiveness of investment covenants. None of 
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the coefficients on overall covenant index and investment restriction covenants 
index in the model with CDS issuance as dependent variable is significant, while 
all the coefficients on financing restriction covenants index are negative and 
significant. This finding tells us that the negative relationship between likelihood 
of CDS issuance and restrictiveness of financing covenants among investment 
grade firm is not driven by rating effect. Among investment grade firms, more 
restrictive financing covenants will lower the likelihood of CDS issuance, 
demonstrating that CDS contract can serve as substitute for the bond covenants to 
mitigate the agency problem in the bond issuance among investment grade bonds. 
Table IX presents the results of logit model with likelihood of CDS issuance as 
dependent variable based on the sample of below investment grade firms ranging 
from BB to C and below. The results on the first and the second column show that 
coefficients on overall covenant index and financing restrictiveness index are 
insignificant. This means that for below investment grade firms the likelihood of 
CDS issuance is not significantly related with either overall covenant index or 
financing restrictiveness index. However, the results of the third column show 
that the coefficient on investment restrictiveness index is positive and statistically 
significant. This result demonstrates that for below investment grade firms the 
likelihood of CDS issuance is positively related with investment restrictiveness 
index. Since the investment covenants become more restrictive as ratings drop, I 
still need to check the effect ratings on the conclusion. 
I present the result of logit model based on the observation of the firms across 
different ratings within below investment grade from table X to table XII, 
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respectively. The results from table X to table XII show that for the firm of each 
ratings within below investment grade the likelihood of CDS issuance has no 
significant relationship with the restrictiveness of overall covenants index and 
restrictiveness of financing covenants. None of the coefficients on overall 
covenant index and financing restriction covenants index in the model with CDS 
issuance as dependent variable is significant. All the coefficients on investment 
covenants index are positive and statistically significant. This finding tells us that 
the positive relationship between likelihood of CDS issuance and restrictiveness 
of investment covenants among below investment grade firm is not driven by 
rating effect. Compared with average 3.5% default rate among investment grade 
firms, the average default rate among below investment grade firm is 25%. The 
default rate of CCC and below firm even as high as 55%. The high default rate 
prevent insurance companies from issuing CDS. The high default rates among 
below investment grade firms give all bondholders the desire to purchase CDS, 
making the CDS among investment grade firms seller market. As a result, the 
investment banks will choose to issue CDS whose reference entities have lower 
default rate. This explains why among below investment grade bond the 
likelihood of CDS issuance is positively related with bond covenants. 
Table XIII presents the relationship between CDS spread and restrictiveness of 
bond covenants. The dependent variables in table XIII are CDS spread. The 
results show that the CDS spread is positively related with restrictiveness of bond 
covenants. Since the CDS spread is connected with the probability of bankruptcy, 
the low rating firms, which have more restrictive covenants, have higher 
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probability of bankruptcy. The result in the table XIII may be subjective to the 
rating effect. The table XIV shows that among the investment grade firm the CDS 
spread is positively related with restrictiveness of financing covenants. From table 
XV to table XIX, I present the result of the relationship between CDS spread and 
restrictiveness of bond covenant base on the firm from AAA to BBB-, 
respectively. In each of the tables from XV to XIX, the coefficient on financing 
covenants is negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that with the 
same rating the CDS spread is negatively related with financing covenants among 
investment grade firms. Also the absolute number of the coefficient increase as 
rating drops, indicating that the effect of financing covenant on the CDS spread 
increase as ratings drop.  
The table XX shows that among the below investment grade firm the CDS spread 
is positively related with restrictiveness of financing covenants. From table XXI 
to table XXIII, I present the result of the relationship between CDS spread and 
restrictiveness of bond covenant base on the firm from BB to CCC and below, 
respectively. In each of the tables from XXI to XXIII, the coefficient on 
investment restriction covenants is negative and statistically significant, 
demonstrating that with the same rating the CDS spread is negatively related with 
investment restriction covenants among below investment grade firms. Also the 
absolute number of the coefficient increase as rating drops, indicating that the 
effect of investment covenant on the CDS spread increase as ratings drop.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
My conclusion about the effect of bond covenants on likelihood of CDS issuance 
and level of CDS spread are robust to the definition of the independent variables. 
I use the following alternative definitions of variable to do the same above tests.  
Alternative overall bond covenants index:  Instead of using scaled bond covenants 
index, I use unscaled bond covenants index to measure the restrictiveness of 
overall bond covenants in the robust test. 
Alternative financing covenants index: I use unscaled financing restriction 
covenants index to measure the restrictiveness of overall bond covenants in the 
robust test. 
Alternative investment covenants index: I use unscaled financing restriction 
covenants index to measure the restrictiveness of overall bond covenants in the 
robust test. 
Alternative working capital: I use current asset minus inventory and current 
liability as working capital in robust test 
Alternative profitability: I use EBIT instead of EBITDA to measure profitability 
in robust test. 
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Alternative volatility: I use the standard deviation of first difference in EBIT over 
the four years preceding bond issuance year scaled by average assets for that 
period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning to 
measure the stability of firms’ financial performance. 
Alternative debt ratio: I use the long term debt over by the difference between 
total asset and the sum of current liabilities plus book equity minus market equity 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2006)  
Since my concern is the effect of bond covenants on the CDS issuance and CDS 
spreads, I only present the coefficients on bond covenant index on table XXIV. 
The results are robust. All the coefficients on the financing (investment) covenant 
index are negative (positive) and significant among the sample of each investment 
grade (below investment grade) rating issuers. Such results suggest that after 
replacing with the alternative variable the conclusions of the four hypothesis still 
hold.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
The essay provides evidence that CDS serves as the complement to bond 
covenants to mitigate the agency problem between bond holders and bond issuers 
in the debt financing. The restrictiveness of bond covenants can significantly 
affect the likelihood of CDS issuance. Unrestrictive bond covenants can induce 
the issuance of CDS because bondholders need extra protection. The essay 
observes that among the investment grade firms the restrictiveness of bond 
covenants are negatively related with the likelihood of CDS issuance, 
demonstrating that CDS contract can provide bondholder with extra protection 
that less restrictive bond covenants cannot. Due to different agency problem 
existing in different quality firm, among investment grade firms the likelihood of 
CDS issuance is negatively related with financing covenants. At the same time, 
bond covenants can also affect CDS spreads because the actual use of bond 
covenants can reduce the firms’ bankruptcy risk. More restrictive bond covenant 
can lower the firms’ default risk, and low default risk will decrease the CDS 
spread. As a result, I find that the level of CDS spreads is negatively related with 
bond covenant.  
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Table I 
The table presents the distribution of CDS and non-CDS bond among the bonds 
across different ratings. The sample of debt issues from the Fixed Investment 
Securities Database (FISD) excluding U.S. government bonds, foreign bonds, 
bonds denominated in foreign currency, and bonds issued by financial firms and 
finance subsidiaries. The information of CDS from MARKIT database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratings CDS Bonds Non-CDS Bonds            Total 
AAA 103 99 202 
AA 466 570 1036 
A 1306 1959 3265 
BBB 1022 1740 2762 
BBB- 1569 2916 4485 
BB 641 1300 1941 
B 633 1476 2109 
CCC and below 71 212 283 
All 5810 10272 16804 
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Table II 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on bond across different ratings from AAA to CCC and 
below. Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all 
covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index 
ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a 
firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. 
Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The financing restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for 
takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural 
log of total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus 
book value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied 
by number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of 
assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. 
The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-
handed side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first 
difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. 
Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is 
the financial metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital 
is calculated as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio 
of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market 
value of asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is 
in that year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and 
is measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by 
market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -3.230*** 
(0.000) 
  
Finance Covenant  -2.214  
Investment Covenant   -1.362 
Log(market_cap) 0.520* 
(0.06) 
0.542*** 
(0.000) 
0.512*** 
(0.000) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.048** -0.025** -0.021** 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.023) 
Volatility 8.364** 7.632*** 8.301* 
 (0.034) (0.003) (0.067 
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Working Cap -0.234*** -0.213** -0.208*** 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.314*** -0.304*** -0.296*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) 
Market-to-book -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.046*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) 
Debt Ratio 1.632*** 1.630** 1.562 
 (0.005) (0.027)  
2001 0.215 0.207 0.197 
2002 0.315 0.306 0.289 
2003 0.213 0.215 0.205 
2004 0.364 0.341 0.351 
2005 0.421 0.435 0.415 
2006 0.235 0.264 0.254 
2007 0.321 0.331 0.333 
2008 0.247 0.259 0.268 
2009 0.123 0.134 0.132 
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Table III 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on bond across different ratings from AAA to BBB-. 
Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all 
covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index 
ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a 
firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. 
Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The financing restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for 
takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural 
log of total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus 
book value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied 
by number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of 
assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. 
The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-
handed side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first 
difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. 
Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is 
the financial metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital 
is calculated as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio 
of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market 
value of asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is 
in that year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and 
is measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by 
market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -3.126   
Finance Covenant  -2.314***  
  (0.000)  
Investment Covenant   -1.241 
Log(market_cap) 0.410** 0.425*** 0.433*** 
 (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.037** -0.040** -0.039** 
 (0.034) (0.026) (0.031) 
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Volatility 7.264** 7.236*** 7.254* 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.067) 
Working Cap -0.345*** -0.298** -0.288*** 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.006) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.425*** -0.411*** -0.396** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
Market-to-book -0.068*** -0.061*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Debt Ratio 1.502*** 1.562** 1.602*** 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.002) 
2001 0.126 0.201 0.163 
2002 0.275 0.298 0.301 
2003 0.343 0.324 0.331 
2004 0.424 0.412 0.441 
2005 0.561 0.541 0.559 
2006 0.325 0.275 0.331 
2007 0.412 0.442 0.364 
2008 0.364 0.354 0.237 
2009 0.421 0.365 0.163 
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Table IV 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of AAA rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -3.106   
Finance Covenant  -2.337***  
  (0.003)  
Investment Covenant   -1.227 
Log(market_cap) 0.398** 0.395*** 0.421*** 
 (0.025) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.031** -0.036** -0.029** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) 
Volatility 7.159** 7.385*** 7.247* 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.061) 
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Working Cap -0.364*** -0.288** -0.269*** 
 (0.000) (0.036) (0.004) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.417*** -0.391*** -0.386*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) 
Market-to-book -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.054*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) 
Debt Ratio 1.498*** 1.550** 1.569*** 
 (0.000) (0.035) (0.002) 
2001 0.116 0.197 0.159 
2002 0.237 0.289 0.296 
2003 0.321 0.317 0.329 
2004 0.394 0.409 0.432 
2005 0.527 0.535 0.549 
2006 0.293 0.269 0.323 
2007 0.403 0.438 0.334 
2008 0.354 0.341 0.242 
2009 0.415 0.356 0.159 
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Table V 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance.  Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of AA rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -3.006   
Finance Covenant  -2.329***  
  (0.003)  
Investment Covenant   -1.189 
Log(market_cap) 0.386** 0.383*** 0.358*** 
 (0.042) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.061** -0.051** -0.048** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.016) 
Volatility 7.146** 7.257*** 7.234* 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.071) 
Working Cap -0.359*** -0.267** -0.198*** 
 (0.001) (0.040) (0.006) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.410*** -0.382*** -0.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Market-to-book -0.059*** -0.051*** -0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) 
Debt Ratio 1.483*** 1.436** 1.468*** 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) 
2001 0.115 0.182 0.149 
2002 0.229 0.269 0.287 
2003 0.313 0.309 0.318 
2004 0.383 0.398 0.408 
2005 0.519 0.498 0.537 
2006 0.286 0.234 0.327 
2007 0.398 0.427 0.369 
2008 0.346 0.334 0.259 
2009 0.403 0.338 0.167 
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Table VI 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of A rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.996   
Finance Covenant  -2.319***  
  (0.006)  
Investment Covenant   -1.179 
Log(market_cap) 0.376** 0.373*** 0.339*** 
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.008) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.059** -0.047** -0.038** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.015) 
Volatility 7.131** 7.149*** 7.142** 
 (0.036) (0.005) (0.027) 
Working Cap -0.349*** -0.259** -0.186*** 
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 (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.398*** -0.378*** -0.349*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Market-to-book -0.056*** -0.046*** -0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) 
Debt Ratio 1.479*** 1.429** 1.357*** 
 (0.002) (0.034) (0.001) 
2001 0.109 0.178 0.135 
2002 0.219 0.257 0.249 
2003 0.309 0.297 0.308 
2004 0.376 0.389 0.389 
2005 0.508 0.486 0.478 
2006 0.279 0.227 0.320 
2007 0.389 0.419 0.358 
2008 0.397 0.327 0.243 
2009 0.403 0.319 0.159 
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Table VII 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of BBB rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.989   
Finance Covenant  -2.307***  
  (0.003)  
Investment Covenant   -1.168 
Log(market_cap) 0.372** 0.364*** 0.328*** 
 (0.028) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.051** -0.039** -0.034** 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.018) 
Volatility 7.123** 7.131*** 7.138* 
 (0.033) (0.000) (0.075) 
Working Cap -0.329*** -0.248** -0.176*** 
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 (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.383*** -0.365*** -0.358*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) 
Market-to-book -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) 
Debt Ratio 1.467*** 1.415** 1.349*** 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.001) 
2001 0.099 0.169 0.129 
2002 0.139 0.249 0.237 
2003 0.298 0.284 0.286 
2004 0.369 0.375 0.376 
2005 0.489 0.479 0.429 
2006 0.264 0.219 0.305 
2007 0.373 0.408 0.343 
2008 0.327 0.319 0.221 
2009 0.385 0.308 0.149 
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Table VIII 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of BBB- rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.729   
Finance Covenant  -2.287***  
  (0.001)  
Investment Covenant   -1.148 
Log(market_cap) 0.358** 0.344*** 0.308*** 
 (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.041** -0.043** -0.029** 
 (0.042) (0.015) (0.026) 
Volatility 7.069** 7.089*** 7.087* 
 (0.041) (0.000) (0.068) 
Working Cap -0.319*** -0.217** -0.166*** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.004) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.376*** -0.352*** -0.313*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) 
Market-to-book -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Debt Ratio 1.459*** 1.398** 1.327*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) 
2001 0.091 0.154 0.118 
2002 0.132 0.211 0.234 
2003 0.286 0.267 0.247 
2004 0.361 0.365 0.363 
2005 0.479 0.468 0.418 
2006 0.258 0.208 0.289 
2007 0.364 0.394 0.334 
2008 0.318 0.308 0.212 
2009 0.378 0.301 0.139 
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Table IX 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of below grade bonds rating from BB 
to CCC and below. Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the 
restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall 
bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction covenants index is the 
proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in 
the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index 
also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures 
the restrictiveness of covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture that a 
firm is faced with. The financing restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. 
Firm size is a proxy for takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size 
is measured as natural log of total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as 
market value of equity plus book value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to 
market stock price multiplied by number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is 
equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value 
of assets is discussed before. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at 
the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average 
assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms 
earning. Working capital is the financial metric that measures operating liquidity 
available to a firm. Working capital is calculated as current assets minus current liability. 
Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization divided by total market value of asset. Year dummy is a binary variable 
which is equal to one if the observation is in that year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a 
proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is measured as the ratio of total debt (both 
short term and long term debt) divided by market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.608   
Finance Covenant  -2.201  
Investment Covenant   -1.115*** 
   (0.004) 
Log(market_cap) 0.331** 0.319*** 0.267*** 
 (0.045) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.026** -0.025** -0.034** 
 (0.038) (0.021) (0.019) 
Volatility 6.761** 6.771*** 6.567* 
 (0.027) (0.003) (0.085) 
Working Cap -0.286*** -0.191** -0.156*** 
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 (0.003) (0.038) (0.007) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.306*** -0.289*** -0.270*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Market-to-book -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.021*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 1.301*** 1.273** 1.191*** 
 (0.002) (0.046) (0.000) 
2001 0.072 0.126 0.115 
2002 0.112 0.185 0.181 
2003 0.224 0.157 0.212 
2004 0.341 0.339 0.291 
2005 0.451 0.432 0.382 
2006 0.228 0.164 0.192 
2007 0.314 0.382 0.323 
2008 0.228 0.292 0.175 
2009 0.346 0.263 0.112 
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Table X 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of BB rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.712   
Finance Covenant  -2.187  
Investment Covenant   -1.129*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) 0.342** 0.331*** 0.288*** 
 (0.029) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.038** -0.039** -0.049** 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.041) 
Volatility 6.895** 6.938*** 7.048** 
 (0.036) (0.002) (0.041) 
Working Cap -0.312*** -0.286** -0.143*** 
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 (0.001) (0.018) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.371*** -0.348*** -0.304*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Market-to-book -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Debt Ratio 1.378*** 1.289** 1.257*** 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.008) 
2001 0.085 0.137 0.107 
2002 0.128 0.197 0.248 
2003 0.249 0.168 0.239 
2004 0.357 0.348 0.348 
2005 0.468 0.457 0.403 
2006 0.242 0.187 0.249 
2007 0.349 0.387 0.342 
2008 0.289 0.294 0.209 
2009 0.369 0.269 0.127 
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Table XI 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of B rating bonds. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.652   
Finance Covenant  -2.171  
Investment Covenant   -1.115*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) 0.339** 0.326*** 0.276*** 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.006) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.028** -0.029** -0.039** 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.015) 
Volatility 6.798** 6.867*** 6.597** 
 (0.035) (0.008) (0.042) 
Working Cap -0.292*** -0.196** -0.163*** 
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 (0.005) (0.035) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -0.359*** -0.298*** -0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) 
Market-to-book -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) 
Debt Ratio 1.362*** 1.275** 1.198*** 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.004) 
2001 0.079 0.129 0.117 
2002 0.116 0.187 0.189 
2003 0.232 0.159 0.218 
2004 0.349 0.331 0.309 
2005 0.459 0.439 0.398 
2006 0.233 0.168 0.218 
2007 0.319 0.387 0.323 
2008 0.231 0.294 0.185 
2009 0.356 0.269 0.118 
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Table XII 
The table presents the logit model of CDS issuance. The dependent variable is the 
probability of CDS issuance. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. 
The results in the table are based on the observation of CCC and below rating bonds. 
Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all 
covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index 
ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a 
firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. 
Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The financing restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for 
takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural 
log of total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus 
book value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied 
by number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of 
assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. 
The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-
handed side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first 
difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. 
Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is 
the financial metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital 
is calculated as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio 
of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market 
value of asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is 
in that year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and 
is measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by 
market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -2.598   
Finance Covenant  -2.158  
Investment Covenant   -1.085*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) 0.328** 0.315*** 0.262*** 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.003) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.023** -0.023** -0.031** 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.016) 
Volatility 6.759** 6.764*** 6.564** 
 (0.023) (0.003) (0.019) 
Working Cap -0.282*** -0.186** -0.152*** 
 (0.000) (0.029) (0.004) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.299*** -0.284*** -0.267*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Market-to-book -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 1.298*** 1.263** 1.187*** 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.005) 
2001 0.069 0.121 0.109 
2002 0.109 0.178 0.178 
2003 0.221 0.152 0.209 
2004 0.338 0.326 0.287 
2005 0.448 0.429 0.378 
2006 0.221 0.159 0.189 
2007 0.309 0.379 0.319 
2008 0.223 0.286 0.169 
2009 0.342 0.258 0.109 
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Table XIII 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread at the time of issuance. Each model uses the different measure of 
bond covenants. The results in the table are based on bond across different ratings from 
AAA to CCC and below with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants index is the 
variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that a firm is 
faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The investment 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction covenants index 
is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting financing activities 
in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing restriction covenants index 
also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover deterrent and economies of 
scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of total market assets. Total 
market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt, while market 
value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by number of outstanding shares.  
Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The book value of assets is the 
total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the 
sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure 
the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial metric that measures 
operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated as current assets 
minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of asset. Year dummy 
is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that year, otherwise zero. 
Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is measured as the ratio of 
total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.142***   
 (0.000)   
Finance Covenant  -3.963  
Investment Covenant   -3.869 
Log(market_cap) 0.547** 0.541*** -0.542*** 
 (0.041) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.497** -0.494** 0.487** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) 
Volatility 0.987** 0.984** 0.978** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) 
Working Cap -0.694*** -0.693** -0.687*** 
 (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.786*** -0.781*** -0.778*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Market-to-book -0.654*** -0.648*** -0.641*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Debt Ratio 2.364*** 2.357** 2.354*** 
 (0.003) (0.025) (0.002) 
2001 1.654 1.648 1.651 
2002 1.369 1.363 1.359 
2003 1.264 1.257 1.254 
2004 1.423 1.419 1.406 
2005 1.364 1.359 1.352 
2006 1.687 1.681 1.678 
2007 1.623 1.618 1.569 
2008 1.597 1.591 1.584 
2009 1.574 1.568 1.557 
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Table XIV 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. The 
results in the table are based on investment grade firm from AAA to BBB-. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.132   
Finance Covenant  -3.975***  
  (0.002)  
Investment Covenant   -3.758 
Log(market_cap) 0.551** 0.597*** -0.572*** 
 (0.034) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.494** -0.563** 0.584** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.039) 
Volatility 0.995** 0.965** 0.953** 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.015) 
Working Cap -0.734*** -0.687** -0.677*** 
 (0.001) (0.021) (0.003) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.816*** -0.786*** -0.788*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Market-to-book -0.734*** -0.758*** -0.667*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) 
Debt Ratio 2.434*** 2.364** 2.468*** 
 (0.000) (0.036) (0.002) 
2001 1.724 1.659 1.754 
2002 1.424 1.438 1.468 
2003 1.276 1.264 1.723 
2004 1.431 1.429 1.146 
2005 1.436 1.362 1.423 
2006 1.756 1.742 1.428 
2007 1.698 1.635 1.436 
2008 1.628 1.648 1.654 
2009 1.639 1.687 1.657 
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Table XV 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants.  The 
results in the table are based on AAA bond with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.162   
Finance Covenant  -4.210***  
  (0.000)  
Investment Covenant   -3.768 
Log(market_cap) 0.687** 0.623*** -0.642*** 
 (0.032) (0.001) (0.004) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.569** -0.697** 0.612** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.011) 
Volatility 1.321** 1.324** 0.895** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.031) 
Working Cap -0.824*** -0.877** -0.787*** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -0.866*** -0.896*** -0.868*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Market-to-book -0.834*** -0.828*** -0.797*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Debt Ratio 2.531*** 2.624** 2.954*** 
 (0.002) (0.037) (0.008) 
2001 1.869 1.709 1.869 
2002 1.561 1.563 1.547 
2003 1.364 1.358 1.785 
2004 1.462 1.648 1.364 
2005 1.536 1.478 1.563 
2006 1.862 1.697 1.848 
2007 1.742 1.745 1.659 
2008 1.687 1.634 1.844 
2009 1.752 1.597 1.757 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
140 
 
 
Table XVI 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. The 
results in the table are based on AA bond with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.634   
Finance Covenant  -4.358***  
  (0.002)  
Investment Covenant   -4.139 
Log(market_cap) 0.658** 0.652*** -0.662*** 
 (0.041) (0.006) (0.000) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.614** -0.787** 0.732** 
 (0.041) (0.012) (0.023) 
Volatility 1.388** 1.824** 1.895** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.016) 
Working Cap -1.654*** -1.377** -1.687*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -1.286*** -1.696*** -1.668*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Market-to-book -0.934*** -0.938*** -0.887*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Debt Ratio 3.259*** 3.564** 3.824*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) 
2001 1.422 1.649 1.559 
2002 1.231 1.614 1.627 
2003 1.184 1.348 1.565 
2004 1.352 1.368 1.424 
2005 1.564 1.248 1.413 
2006 1.839 1.787 1.678 
2007 1.756 1.865 1.859 
2008 1.694 1.784 1.914 
2009 1.751 1.617 1.823 
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Table XVII 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. The 
results in the table are based on A bond with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.789   
Finance Covenant  -4.598***  
  (0.005)  
Investment Covenant   -4.754 
Log(market_cap) 0.638** 0.612*** -0.592*** 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.003) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.859** -0.823** 0.865** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.041) 
Volatility 1.598** 1.947** 1.967** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.012) 
Working Cap -1.548*** -1.246** -1.354*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -1.264*** -1.548*** -1.548*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
Market-to-book -0.896*** -0.887*** -0.896*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 4.158*** 4.154** 4.378*** 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.041) 
2001 1.236 1.634 1.694 
2002 1.647 1.685 1.536 
2003 1.869 1.869 1.647 
2004 1.248 1.769 1.521 
2005 1.369 1.654 1.654 
2006 1.756 1.758 1.598 
2007 1.364 1.835 1.934 
2008 1.745 1.687 1.852 
2009 1.639 1.695 1.687 
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Table XVIII 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. The 
results in the table are based on BBB bond with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.854   
Finance Covenant  -4.789***  
  (0.005)  
Investment Covenant   -4.842 
Log(market_cap) 0.756** 0.763*** -0.635*** 
 (0.032) (0.001) (0.003) 
Log(market_cap)2 -0.936** -0.895** 0.905** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.031) 
Volatility 1.723** 2.047** 1.986** 
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 (0.023) (0.017) (0.037) 
Working Cap -1.848*** -1.446** -1.574*** 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -1.387*** -1.634*** -1.698*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) 
Market-to-book -0.925*** -0.937*** -0.916*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Debt Ratio 4.238*** 4.604** 4.568*** 
 (0.000) (0.031) (0.006) 
2001 1.356 1.714 1.825 
2002 1.712 1.725 1.754 
2003 1.934 1.925 1.687 
2004 1.354 1.856 1.634 
2005 1.428 1.674 1.734 
2006 1.805 1.868 1.634 
2007 1.436 1.745 1.834 
2008 1.618 1.867 1.735 
2009 1.645 1.755 1.648 
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Table XIX 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants. The 
results in the table are based on BBB- bond with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.901   
Finance Covenant  -4.836***  
  (0.001)  
Investment Covenant   -4.923 
Log(market_cap) 0.836** 0.812*** -0.736*** 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.007) 
Log(market_cap)2 -1.038** -1.058** -1.114** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.032) 
Volatility 1.856** 2.112** 1.856** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.047) 
Working Cap -1.924*** -1.526** -1.635*** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.004) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -1.487*** -1.854*** -1.824*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) 
Market-to-book -1.057*** -1.035*** -1.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 4.347*** 4.734** 4.936*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
2001 1.488 1.835 1.879 
2002 1.689 1.827 1.784 
2003 1.967 1.967 1.769 
2004 1.429 1.867 1.748 
2005 1.567 1.674 1.864 
2006 1.875 1.876 1.785 
2007 1.567 1.836 1.964 
2008 1.736 1.864 1.395 
2009 1.624 1.845 1.758 
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Table XX 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants.  The 
results in the table are based on below investment bonds from BB to CCC and below with 
CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness 
of all covenants in bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants 
index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that 
measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting investment activities in the bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The investment restriction covenants index also ranges 
from 0 to 1. Financing restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the 
restrictiveness of covenants restricting financing activities in the bond indenture that a 
firm is faced with. The financing restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. 
Firm size is a proxy for takeover deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size 
is measured as natural log of total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as 
market value of equity plus book value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to 
market stock price multiplied by number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is 
equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value 
of assets is discussed before. The book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at 
the bottom of the left-handed side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of first difference in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over the four years preceding the sample year scaled by average 
assets for that period. Volatility is a good index to measure the stability of the firms 
earning. Working capital is the financial metric that measures operating liquidity 
available to a firm. Working capital is calculated as current assets minus current liability. 
Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization divided by total market value of asset. Year dummy is a binary variable 
which is equal to one if the observation is in that year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a 
proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is measured as the ratio of total debt (both 
short term and long term debt) divided by market value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.967   
Finance Covenant  -5.114  
Investment Covenant   -5.217*** 
   (0.002) 
Log(market_cap) 0.936** 0.954*** -0.869*** 
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -1.236** -1.241** -1.264** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.047) 
Volatility 1.936** 2.245** 1.948** 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.041) 
Working Cap -1.962*** -1.634** -1.758*** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.008) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -1.548*** -1.957** -1.967*** 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.003) 
Market-to-book -1.264*** -1.214*** -1.347*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 4.657*** 4.875** 5.266*** 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
2001 1.674 1.967 1.923 
2002 1.785 1.934 1.857 
2003 1.864 1.869 1.824 
2004 1.687 1.924 1.865 
2005 1.896 1.864 1.923 
2006 1.947 1.924 1.927 
2007 1.567 2.316 2.014 
2008 1.769 1.873 1.358 
2009 1.667 1.497 1.824 
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Table XXI 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants.  The 
results in the table are based on BB bonds with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -4.859   
Finance Covenant  -5.011  
Investment Covenant   -5.137*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) 0.923** 0.942*** -0.857*** 
 (0.037) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -1.347** -1.352** -1.364** 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) 
Volatility 2.136** 2.315** 2.014** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.014) 
Working Cap -1.836*** -1.756** -1.869*** 
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.004) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -1.638*** -1.857** -1.867*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) 
Market-to-book -1.302*** -1.257** -1.468*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) 
Debt Ratio 4.869*** 4.987** 5.368*** 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.008) 
2001 1.869 2.341 2.314 
2002 1.489 1.598 1.967 
2003 1.748 1.364 1.867 
2004 1.784 1.865 1.789 
2005 1.948 1.547 1.874 
2006 1.879 1.869 1.847 
2007 1.688 2.647 2.236 
2008 1.865 1.423 1.425 
2009 1.759 1.987 1.869 
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Table XXII 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants.  The 
results in the table are based on B bonds with CDS issuance. Overall bond covenants 
index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond indenture that 
a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. Investment 
restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants 
restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The 
investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -5.159   
Finance Covenant  -5.128  
Investment Covenant   -5.369*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) 0.936** 0.987*** -0.967*** 
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.008) 
Log(market_cap)2 -1.485** -1.598** -1.459** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.043) 
Volatility 2.547** 2.894** 2.647** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.034) 
Working Cap -1.966*** -1.866** -1.939*** 
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 (0.002) (0.042) (0.000) 
       EBITDA Ratio -1.836*** -1.979** -1.967*** 
 (0.003) (0.031) (0.003) 
Market-to-book -1.485*** -1.439** -1.548*** 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.001) 
Debt Ratio 5.364*** 6.187** 5.987*** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.004) 
2001 1.954 2.541 2.484 
2002 2.369 2.314 2.314 
2003 2.247 2.156 1.963 
2004 2.154 2.231 2.314 
2005 2.314 2.356 2.154 
2006 2.364           2.364 2.635 
2007 2.156 2.489 2.631 
2008 2.846 2.356 2.314 
2009 2.145 2.367 2.458 
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Table XXIII 
The table presents the relation between CDS spread and bond covenants. The dependent 
variable is CDS spread. Each model uses the different measure of bond covenants.  The 
results in the table are based on CCC and below bonds with CDS issuance. Overall bond 
covenants index is the variable that proxy the restrictiveness of all covenants in bond 
indenture that a firm is faced with. The overall bond covenants index ranges from 0 to 1. 
Investment restriction covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of 
covenants restricting investment activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. 
The investment restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Financing restriction 
covenants index is the proxy that measures the restrictiveness of covenants restricting 
financing activities in the bond indenture that a firm is faced with. The financing 
restriction covenants index also ranges from 0 to 1. Firm size is a proxy for takeover 
deterrent and economies of scale. In this paper firm size is measured as natural log of 
total market assets. Total market asset is calculated as market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, while market value of equity is equal to market stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding shares.  Market-to-book ratio is equal to the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is discussed before. The 
book value of assets is the total value of assets shown at the bottom of the left-handed 
side of balance sheet. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of first difference in 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the four 
years preceding the sample year scaled by average assets for that period. Volatility is a 
good index to measure the stability of the firms earning. Working capital is the financial 
metric that measures operating liquidity available to a firm. Working capital is calculated 
as current assets minus current liability. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total market value of 
asset. Year dummy is a binary variable which is equal to one if the observation is in that 
year, otherwise zero. Debt ratio is a proxy to measure the firm’s leverage level and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt (both short term and long term debt) divided by market 
value of total asset. 
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Overall Covenant -5.213   
Finance Covenant  -5.189  
Investment Covenant   -5.569*** 
   (0.000) 
Log(market_cap) -1.636** 1.876*** -1.677*** 
 (0.032) (0.005) (0.001) 
Log(market_cap)2 -1.785** -1.878** -1.859** 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) 
Volatility 3.347** 3.294** 3.147** 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.028) 
Working Cap -2.066*** -2.166** -2.239*** 
 (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) 
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       EBITDA Ratio -2.136*** -2.379** -2.467*** 
 (0.004) (0.021) (0.000) 
Market-to-book -1.985*** -1.839** -1.948*** 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.002) 
Debt Ratio 5.854*** 6.987** 7.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.001) 
2001 2.834 2.761 2.844 
2002 2.857 2.531 2.454 
2003 2.468 2.618 2.063 
2004 2.524 2.347 2.524 
2005 2.444 2.661 2.451 
2006 2.631           2.634 2.632 
2007 2.954 2.524 2.831 
2008 2.637 2.647 2.423 
2009 2.327 2.637 2.862 
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Table XXIV 
The table presents the result of robustness checks with the alternative variables. It shows 
the coefficients on different covenant index across different rating sample. Overall bond 
covenants, financing covenants index and investment covenants index are unscaled index. 
 
Logit model of CDS issuance 
 
 
Ratings 
 
Coef. on overall 
bond covenants 
Coef. on bond 
financing 
covenants 
Coef. on bond 
investment 
covenants 
All sample -1.235*** -1.146 -1.364 
 (0.000)   
AAA -1.456 -1.364*** -1.272 
  (0.001)  
AA -1.487 -1.325*** -1.318 
  (0.007)  
A -1.523 -1.342*** -2.164 
  (0.000)  
BBB 1.234 -1.245*** -1.965 
  (0.000)  
BBB- -1.269 -1.546*** 0.218 
  (0.000)  
Investment grade 
sample 
 
-1.325 
 
-1.478*** 
 
-1.342 
  (0.002)  
BB 1.237 -1.247 1.412** 
   (0.031) 
B -0.364 0.231 1.392*** 
   (0.000) 
CCC and below -1.326 -0.478 1.259** 
   (0.027) 
Below investment 
grade sample 
 
-1.246 
 
-1.281 
 
1.348** 
   (0.023) 
Regression model of CDS spreads 
All sample -1.589*** -1.745 -1.324 
 (0.000)   
AAA -2.163 -1.687***   1.547 
  (0.002)  
AA -2.364 -1.764**   1.671 
  (0.032)  
A -1.364 -1.624** -1.364 
  (0.023)  
BBB -1.754 -1.264*** -1.268 
  (0.002)  
BBB- -1.549 -1.458** -1.624 
  (0.021)  
Investment grade 
sample 
 
-1.364 
 
-1.634** 
 
-1.354 
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  (0.028)  
BB -1.597 -1.347 -1.654** 
   (0.018) 
B -1.632 -1.472 -1.269*** 
   (0.002) 
CCC and below -1.745 -1.367 -1.687*** 
   (0.001) 
Below investment 
Grade sample 
 
-1.649 
 
-1.632 
 
-1.259*** 
   (0.003) 
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